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 The planning methodologies used today by most U.S. fire departments are 
excellent for traditional missions, but wholly inadequate for the threats posed by 
terrorism.   Planning in the fire service and the rest of the first responder community 
historically has relied on a one-dimensional approach that uses a scenario-based planning 
(SBP) methodology.  This thesis argues that the fire service and others in the first 
responder community will be able to contribute to homeland security missions much 
more effectively, and efficiently, by switching to specially adapted versions of 
capabilities-based planning. 
 This thesis proposes a new integrated planning methodology that combines the 
planning strengths of scenario-based planning, threat-based planning, and capabilities-
based planning.  The new method identifies capabilities that could be used to manage and 
mitigate the consequences of the different types of contingencies within the various 
response spectrums.   It allows an organization to perform analysis and efficiency studies 
to evaluate the different spectrums of contingencies against existing capabilities and 
create a menu of capabilities necessary for the first responder to respond to all its 
missions, including immediate threats and terrorism, in the most efficient and cost-
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 The planning methodologies used today by most U.S. fire departments and other 
first responders are excellent for traditional missions, but wholly inadequate for the 
threats posed by terrorism.   Planning in the fire service and the rest of the first responder 
community historically has relied on a one-dimensional approach that uses a scenario-
based planning methodology.  This thesis argues that the fire service and others in the 
first responder community will be able to contribute to homeland security missions much 
more effectively, and efficiently, by adopting specially adapted versions of capabilities-
based planning. 
The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that the nation as a whole was in 
a state of complacency, as far as terrorism within the United States was concerned.  That 
event, combined with grievous terrorist acts of the 1990s such as the bombings of the 
World Trade Center in 1993 and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, 
made it clear to millions of Americans that our intelligence community and local law 
enforcement agencies need improvement, and that the agencies responsible for disaster 
response and acts of terrorism must be better prepared than they were.  Today, 
consequently, there is widespread popular and government support for the notion that 
emergency response personnel need to be better prepared to deal with terrorist activity 
than they are currently.  A new contingency planning model will be a critical component 
of any effort to enhance first-responder preparedness.  
At present, emergency response personnel are well prepared to respond to fires, 
various civil emergencies, and law enforcement issues.  They still, however, are not fully 
prepared to respond to the numerous possible consequences of terrorist attacks.  The 
foundation for first responder planning up to now has been what is known as scenario-
based planning (SBP).  This is a system not of predicting the future but rather of 
describing through the use of various scenarios what is likely to happen based on what is 
already known.   The process of SBP, in other words, is to visualize an established group 
of distinct futures all of which are plausible, based on the experience of actual events that 
have happened in the past.   
 xvi
While it is widely used in the first responder community, SBP is inadequate to 
deal with the wide scope of potential developments surrounding acts of terrorism, 
because an infinite number of scenarios would require development.  Furthermore, it 
would be impossible to implement every plan imaginable for the many different first 
responder scenarios because of the limited budgets with which first responders operate. 
    Threat-based planning (TBP) strategies, which have been used successfully in 
military planning, are emerging as a new tool in the first responder community since the 
terrorist attacks of 2001, in which passenger jet liners were used as weapons of mass 
destruction.  TBP is threat driven, which means that it focuses on countering the specific 
threats that are most likely to occur in the present.  The TBP methodology can enhance 
planning for response to immediate terrorist threats, but only as long as those threats 
conform to first responder capabilities.  Because this planning strategy focuses on the 
immediate known threat, it is inadequate by itself to deal with the wide scope of potential 
events surrounding acts of terrorism and asymmetric warfare.    
A planning methodology known as capabilities-based planning (CBP) has 
emerged in this evolving complex environment that could fill the need for new response 
capabilities.   CBP, which is being adopted by the U.S. military, focuses on certain types 
of generic capabilities that contribute flexibility and adaptability, and will enable 
responders to meet a range of contingencies effectively, even when those contingencies 
cannot be predicted.  Although this planning method may better prepare responders for 
some aspects of the homeland security mission, however, it fails to emphasize the 
importance of preparing for those routine events with which first responders must deal 
most of the time.  CBP also does not address the timely planning necessary for an 
immediate threat when it is beyond the organization’s established capabilities.    
The military, fire service, and other members of the first responder community 
share many similarities in the way each plans and responds to threats and contingencies.   
Among this group, the military is moving forward fastest in developing new planning 
methods and adapting to possible asymmetrical threats in part through adoption of 
capabilities-based planning.    
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supports the fire service and the 
rest of the first responder community through funding.  To ensure optimal planning using 
allotted funds, the current contingency planning process must be updated both to better 
prepare emergency responders to deal with routine firefighting and emergency duties, and 
improve their potential response to future terrorist attacks.  This new initiative merges the 
three different planning methodologies described above, SBP, TBP, and CBP, into an all-
inclusive, adaptable planning strategy for homeland security.   
The purpose of improving the first responder community’s planning methodology 
is to define a clear sense of direction that can be followed consistently, and thus provide a 
rationale for developing the most relevant first responder capabilities within each 
organization's established limitations.  Achieving the objective of optimal emergency 
response preparedness for homeland security in an uncertain and complex environment 
requires the addition of capabilities-based planning to existing first responder planning 
(SBP and TBP). CBP strengthens first responders' confidence by acknowledging 
interdependence among agencies and developing concepts that reduce gaps and seams 
among first responder organizations.  It balances near-term capabilities with longer-term 
requirements, and incorporates a national perspective for emergency response 
preparedness to reduce strategic risk.   
The new hybrid methodology would focus less on any specific response to 
terrorism, and more on how a terrorist might perpetrate a terrorism event.  If utilized by 
first responders for homeland security, the new planning strategy will also help develop 
and maintain the capabilities and priorities that have been identified through planning 
exercises.  To develop a counter-contingency response package, planners within the 
organization would simply answer the question “What can we do about a given 
contingency?” and then use the different strengths of the CBP, TBP, and SBP 
methodologies to create their plan.  This combined methodology identifies capabilities 
that could be used for consequence management and mitigation of various contingencies 
that fall within the responders' mission spectrums (traditional response, immediate 
threats, and homeland security).  Planners would carry out analysis and efficiency studies 
to evaluate contingencies against the organization's existing capabilities, to determine the 
 xviii
most effective and efficient plans.  This process would result in a menu of capabilities 
necessary for the particular organization in question to respond to the full spectrum of 
contingencies, including acts of terrorism.  
  




 The planning methodologies used today by most U.S. fire departments are 
excellent for traditional missions, but wholly inadequate for the threats posed by 
terrorism.   Planning in the fire service and the rest of the first responder community has 
historically relied on a one-dimensional approach that uses a scenario-based planning 
(SBP) methodology.  This thesis argues that the fire service and others in the first 
responder community will be able to contribute to homeland security missions much 
more effectively and efficiently by switching to specially adapted versions of 
capabilities-based planning. 
The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that the nation as a whole was in 
a state of complacency, as far as terrorism within the United States was concerned.  That 
event, combined with grievous terrorist acts of the 1990s such as the bombings of the 
World Trade Center in 1993 and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, 
made it clear to millions of Americans that our intelligence community and local law 
enforcement agencies needed improvement, and that the agencies responsible for 
responding to disasters and acts of terrorism must be better prepared than they were. 
Today, consequently, there is widespread popular and government support for the notion 
that emergency response personnel need to be better prepared to deal with terrorist 
activity than they are currently.  A new contingency planning model is critical to improve 
methods of response.  
At present, emergency response personnel are well prepared to respond to fires, 
various civil emergencies, and law enforcement issues.  They still, however, are not fully 
prepared to respond to the numerous possible consequences of terrorist attacks.  The 
foundation for first responder planning up to now has been what is known as scenario-
based planning (SBP).  This is a system not of predicting the future, but rather describing 
through the use of scenarios what is likely to happen based on what is already known.  
The process of SBP is to visualize an established group of distinct futures all of which are 
plausible, based on the experience of actual events that have happened in the past.  SBP is 
inadequate to deal with the wide scope of potential developments surrounding acts of 
terrorism because an infinite number of scenarios would require development.  
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Furthermore, it would be impossible to implement every plan imaginable for the many 
different scenarios because of the limited budgets with which first responders operate. 
    Threat-based planning (TBP) strategies, which have been used successfully in 
military planning, are emerging as a tool in the first responder community since the 
terrorist attacks of 2001, in which passenger jet liners were used as weapons of mass 
destruction.  TBP is threat driven, which means that it focuses on countering the specific 
threats that are most likely to occur in the present.  TBP can enhance planning for 
response to immediate terrorist threats, but only as long as the threat conforms to first 
responder capabilities.  Because this planning strategy focuses only on the immediate 
known threat, it is inadequate to deal with the wide scope of potential events surrounding 
acts of terrorism and asymmetric warfare.   
A planning methodology known as capabilities-based planning (CBP) has 
emerged in this evolving complex environment that may address the need for new 
response capabilities.  CBP, which is being adopted by the U.S. military, focuses on 
certain types of generic capabilities that contribute flexibility and adaptability, and will 
enable responders to meet a range of contingencies effectively, even when those 
contingencies cannot be predicted.  Although this planning method may better prepare 
responders for some aspects of the homeland security mission, however, it fails to 
emphasize the importance of preparing for those routine events with which first 
responders must deal most of the time.  CBP also does not address the timely planning 
necessary for an immediate threat when it is beyond the organization’s established 
capabilities.    
The military, fire service, and other members of the first responder community 
share many similarities in the way each plans and responds to threats and contingencies.   
Among this group, the military is moving forward fastest in developing new planning 
methods and adapting to possible asymmetric threats, in part through adoption of 
capabilities-based planning.    
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supports the fire service and the 
rest of the first responder community through funding.  To ensure optimal planning using 
allotted funds, the current contingency planning process must be updated both to better 
prepare emergency responders to deal with routine firefighting and emergency duties, and 
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improve their potential response to future terrorist attacks.  This new initiative merges the 
three different planning methodologies described above, SBP, TBP, and CBP, into an all-
inclusive, adaptable planning strategy for homeland security.   
 
A. THESIS ARGUMENT   
The attacks of September 11, 2001, showed that the United States is no longer 
safe from major acts of terrorism coming from abroad, and demonstrated that these acts 
are often unpredictable.  The United States from that day forward became a nation at risk 
from a new and changing asymmetrical threat, and immediately recognized the need to 
make homeland security a top priority. 
First responders who employed traditional planning methods for emergency 
preparedness and response were taken by surprise by the horrific acts and consequences 
of the September 11th attacks.  The first responder community must now consciously 
prepare to manage the consequences of terrorism.  The Fire Commissioner of the Fire 
Department of New York stated in the department’s 2004/2005 Strategic Plan, “The 
disaster demonstrated the need for us to increase our capabilities in certain areas.  Within 
a few hours, the threats to our world had become exponentially more complex.   The Fire 
Department, in turn, needed to adapt.”1   
First responders have reached an important turning point, from which they now 
have to shift their focus and planning to respond to acts of terrorism.  The type and 
magnitude of attack and the potential scale of response require difficult choices from the 
first responder community to plan for operations within budget limitations.  Finite 
personnel, equipment, and resources mean individual organizations cannot plan for 
everything. 
While very effective for traditional missions, the first responders’ current 
planning approach is inadequate to deal with a broad range of asymmetric threats, 
uncertainty, and surprise.  Planners must account for acts of terrorism, and be ready to 
respond to the consequences of events with reasonable solutions.  This can be achieved 
only if they bring conceptual changes to their present planning methodology.  In many 
ways the present SBP and TBP planning methods are more than adequate to deal 
 
1 Fire Department City of New York, Strategic Plan 2004-2005, “Message From the Fire 
Commissioner, Honorable Nicholas Scoppetta” January 1, 2004. 
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successfully with most problems; they do not, however, look beyond the present to take 
into account the elements of surprise and horror inherent to acts of terrorism. 
The incorporation of CBP with traditional planning methodologies will enable the 
fire service and the rest of the first responder community to perform much more 
effectively in the future by improving resource allocation and training.  In particular, this 
critically important community will be better prepared to respond to possible future acts 
of terrorism. 
In Chapter II, this thesis examines the current planning methods (SBP and TBP) 
used in the fire service and the rest of the first responder community, especially in the 
Fire Department of New York, and identifies weaknesses and problems in them when it 
comes to responding to acts of terrorism and homeland security.  Chapter III then 
describes relevant new “best planning practices” used by the U.S. military that could 
remedy the shortfalls in first responder planning methods.  The two distinct planning 
methodologies, SBP and TBP, used by the military and the first responder community are 
explored in Chapters IV and V respectively.  Chapter VI discusses the new type of 
planning methodology, CBP, used by the military and now being considered by the 
Department of Homeland Security.  Chapter VII introduces a new and improved first 
responder planning methodology for homeland security, incorporating necessary features 
from scenario, threat, and capabilities-based planning to develop a methodology for full 
spectrum emergency response and preparedness.  Chapter VIII illustrates the application 
of this methodology to the first responder community, by applying it to a case study of 
the FDNY.  Chapter IX concludes the thesis with a summary of its main points and 
findings.  
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II. TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY: THE NEW 
CHALLENGE TO THE FIRST RESPONDER COMMUNITY  
A. OVERVIEW: FIRST RESPONDERS AND A NATION AT RISK 
National security has changed in recent years, and the United States is now a 
potential target in which large-scale terrorist attacks can occur.  As a result, government 
agencies involved in homeland security need to adapt policies to take into account the 
new dangers they may face.  Fire departments throughout the United States are 
particularly at risk of being left behind because they are major players as first responders.  
Consequently, they must develop new ways of thinking about security problems, if they 
are to respond effectively to potential disasters involving fire in the twenty-first century.   
This is an age in which a new kind of international criminal violates borders and 
ignores the ethical and moral norms most of us have taken for granted. The United States 
is a large and diverse area known for its power, wealth, civic freedom, and economic 
strength; thus there are some who view it as a prime target and the world’s most 
vulnerable place for a terrorist attack.  According to the U.S. Department of Defense's 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001: “There are many threats against this nation, 
and they will take many forms.  They range from the threat of major war to the faceless 
threat of terror.”2   
 On February 11, 2003, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert 
Mueller and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet told a Senate 
Intelligence Committee hearing on worldwide threats that the terrorist organization al 
Qaeda still poses the greatest threat to the United States, despite U.S. military operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This organization is dedicated to striking the U. S. homeland.3   
The  worldwide  al Qaeda  network  prefers  hitting high-profile targets in a way that will  
 
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, page 1, 
retrieved September 16, 2004 from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. 
3 “FBI and CIA say Al Qaeda is Biggest Threat,” Newsmax.com, February 12, 2003, retrieved June, 
12, 2004: http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/2/11/161724.shtml.  
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cause mass casualties; it may be planning to use toxins or poison against targets such as 
government facilities, airliners, and landmarks, and is actively seeking weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).4
According to the CIA, terrorist interest in WMD is on the rise, as is the number of 
potential terrorists.5  Although the use of WMD historically has been rare, the possibility 
of a terrorist attack with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons is an 
ongoing concern among national security policymakers, in the face of a clear trend 
among terrorists toward inflicting large numbers of casualties.6  Stories about black 
market diversion of nuclear materials to individuals, groups, and nations in the Middle 
East and Asia that seek nuclear weapons have exacerbated fears that the United States 
will be a target. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security states that all disasters are 
ultimately local events where first responders are the first to react and the last to leave the 
scene.7  The strategic objectives of homeland security as stated in the National Strategy 
are to: 
• prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
• reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 
• minimize the damage and promote recovery from attacks that do occur. 
 
All terrorist incidents also are local, or at least will start that way.  Effective 
preparedness, response, and recovery can only be achieved with the recognition that local 
 
4 “FBI and CIA say Al Qaeda is Biggest Threat,” Newsmax.com, February 12, 2003, retrieved June, 
12, 2004: http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/2/11/161724.shtml.  
5 “Combating Terrorism, Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and 
Biological Attack,” United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 1999, page 
18 retrieved June 12, 2004 from http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99163.pdf. 
6 Bowman, Steve “Weapons of Mass destruction: The Terrorist Threat,” CRS Report to Congress, 
RL31332 March 7, 2002, summary page, retrieved June 12, 2004 from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31332.pdf. See also “FBI: Al Qaeda is Still Top Threat to U.S.” 
Foxnews.com, February 6, 2003 retrieved June 12, 2004 from 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,77711,00.html.  
7 "National Strategy For Homeland Security," July 6, 2002, p. viii, retrieved 12 January 2004: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/ 
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responders are the first line of defense, and that these responders must have plans and 
resources to fulfill their critical roles in the fight against terrorism.8
The purpose of planning in the first responder community is to define a clear 
direction that can be followed consistently, and thus set the stage for responders to use 
their most relevant capabilities within existing limitations.  The challenges are to plan for 
and acquire the needed capacity; to organize, train, and properly equip first responders; 
and to better evaluate the different threats to our nation than ever before. 
 
B. EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
First responders are responsible for managing the consequences of customary 
missions such as fires, explosions, medical emergencies, air crashes, railroad crashes, and 
hazardous material incidents, to name a few.  They are also tasked with managing the 
consequences of terrorism.   
The consequences of terrorism usually manifest as explosion, fire, and the 
collapse of structures, and potentially, in the case of chemical, biological, or radiological 
release, by mass casualties and widespread panic.  First responders are in charge of the 
response management for all of those elements within their jurisdiction.  No other city, 
state, or federal agency is in a more immediate position to perform timely consequence 
management on a larger scale.   
The attacks of September 11th, followed by anthrax-contaminated letters sent 
through the regular post, attempts to bring bombs onto airplanes concealed in shoes, 
additional terrorist acts in Indonesia, Spain and elsewhere, and the threat of further attack 
by terrorists against the United States, have all served to increase the demand for 
sustained vigilance and the need for planned responses by government, first responders, 
law enforcement, health professionals, the private sector, and private citizens.  
Emergency and consequence management are the application of an organized 
response to what is generally perceived to be a chaotic and unmanageable situation.   The 
first   responder’s   primary   goal   in   response   to   acts   of   terrorism  is  consequence  
 
8 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, (Arlington, VA: RAND, December 
2002), pp. 27-28. 
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management.  These are the measures taken by the first responder to protect life and 
property, mitigate hazards, restore essential services, and provide emergency relief to 
individuals affected by a terrorist event. 
Past acts of terrorism give us an idea of how terrorist groups attack.  The first 
responder community must learn from what we already know, and update its planning 
methods while at the same time adopting new strategies to prepare for the consequence 
management of future events. In the aftermath of any terrorist attack, it is the first 
responder community – police officers, firefighters, emergency medical providers, public 
works personnel, and emergency management officials – who will be responsible for 
consequence management in what is generally perceived to be a chaotic and 
unmanageable situation.   
Terrorist attacks most likely will become mass casualty incidents due to the 
violent, indiscriminate nature of these kinds of events and the intentional targeting of 
civilians using WMD.  An effective response to a carefully executed attack using 
chemical or biological weapons, for example, would require rescue personnel with proper 
protective equipment, who would be able to haul victims out of contaminated areas, 
decontaminate them, and administer antidotes.9  Many first responders have legitimate 
questions about the range of capabilities needed in this new environment, and how to 
operate optimally with available funds.  First responders will still respond to fires and 
emergencies on a daily basis, but they now must be aware of those events that are 
unusual, and consider them to be possible terrorist acts.  Each individual will need to use 
all the common sense, skill, and professionalism he or she can muster, and take 
advantage of constant training and preplanning to efficiently and safely manage the 
consequences of terrorism.  
 
C. PREPAREDNESS 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, policymakers and lawmakers recognized 
that the preparedness and response capabilities of our first responders needed to be 
significantly strengthened to meet the threat of terrorism in the homeland.    
 
9 Falkenrath, Richard, Newman, Robert, and Thayer, Bradley,  America’s Achilles’ Heel Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical  Terrorism  and Covert Attack, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 
London, England, 2001 pages 22-23. 
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First responders became aware of the lack of an accepted planning framework 
when they were confronted with a range of threats and found themselves unprepared to 
react effectively.  This was evident in 2001 when New York City received threats of dirty 
bombs in the borough of Manhattan, chemical releases in the subway and rail system, and 
biological attacks throughout various local communities.  Since the first responder 
community would have been unable to deal adequately with all of these events if they 
actually had occurred, it became apparent to them that they needed a new comprehensive 
and comprehendible planning process.    
New York's first responders must be able to assess risks and threats across the city 
so that they can create specific detailed plans for use in key locations.10   These plans 
have to include the identification of potential future targets, and better ways to manage 
both the consequences of incidents and victim care.  Planners must take other agencies 
into consideration, such as the local Office of Emergency Management, the Police 
Department, the Fire Department, the Emergency Medical Division, the Department of 
Environmental Protection, the Buildings Department, and area hospitals, and be ready to 
consult them during the planning process, when necessary to ensure a coordinated 
response.   
In planning for a terrorist attack, first responders must have a focused, detailed 
plan in place and then follow it as closely as the situation permits, adapting as necessary 
according to the fluidity of the situation.  First responders must be prepared to manage 
the consequences of terrorism within the greatest bounds of safety for themselves.  One 
important way planners can anticipate future events and needs is by studying past 
terrorist attacks, how they were initiated, and how they were abated.   Once the plans are 
made available to all first responder organizations, members have to be trained until 
everyone can respond proficiently to the many conceivable scenarios.  The first 
responder’s main focus should be on the formulated plan, rather than on the threat 
itself.11  There are many threats, some credible and others not.   Good planning means 
 
10 Mckinsey & Company, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness, The Fire Department of the City of New 
York, August 19, 2002, page 12. 
11 Essex, Michael J., “Practical Planning for the Terrorist Event,” Firehouse Magazine April 2002; 
retrieved October 2, 2004 from http://www.firehouse.com/magazine/archives/2002/April/. 
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that first responders will not be taken by surprise, but will be prepared to act with 
appropriate resources, tactics, and procedures.  
  
D. SUMMARY 
The emergency responder’s main focus is on civilian safety and the minimization 
of damage during recovery from the consequences of a terrorist attack.  The fire service 
and other first responders presently are struggling to ensure that they will be able to 
respond to terrorist threats, and are questioning traditional planning methods.  What 
scenarios should they develop and address?  What scenarios are they missing?  Which 
threats might realistically materialize?      
As our nation moves forward during these challenging times, efforts to answer the 
question, “How should first responders prepare and respond to acts of terrorism?” 
suggests a very complex problem.  The first responder must be prepared to save life, 
mitigate hazards, and minimize damage incurred during a terrorist attack.  Experience has 
shown that successful planning and training are the keys to providing a timely, effective, 
and professional response to terrorist incidents and natural disasters.   
The traditional purpose of contingency planning is to provide senior decision 
makers in first-responder organizations with the information, analysis, and 
recommendations they need to formulate the best tactics and procedures to use during 
response. The long-established method of planning for response to fires, medical and 
other emergencies, law enforcement situations, and numerous other daily incidents has 
relied on scenario-based planning.  A threat-based planning strategy has also evolved, 
which allows first responders to better plan for those immediate and current threats 
within their capabilities.  
In the right capacity and at the appropriate time and place, the traditional first 
responder planning methods may afford an appropriate response to routine fires and 
emergencies – the manageable threats of the present.  However, present planning 
methods cannot consistently or effectively ensure a safe and appropriate response to 
asymmetrical threats. First responders must prepare to minimize the damage and recover 
from any future terrorist attack that may occur despite our best efforts at prevention.12  
 
12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, page 
41retrieved January 16, 2004 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/. 
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This can only be done by taking a fresh look at present planning methods and adapting 
them as necessary, while considering new innovative ways to confront terrorist threats.  
 In his famous work, The Art of War, Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote words about 
war and conflict that remain relevant to the terrorist threats of our own times: "Do not 
repeat tactics that have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the 
infinite variety of circumstances."13
 
13 Davis, Paul K., New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough. page 480, 
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 III. U.S. MILITARY PLANNING PERSPECTIVE   
A. OVERVIEW  
The U.S. military has been reviewing its defense planning methodologies since 
the end of the Cold War.  The Pentagon's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, for 
example, focused on military readiness and modernization issues.  Throughout the Cold 
War itself, military planners developed little in the way of paradigms or methods to guide 
defense planning for nonstandard contingencies (i.e., contingencies other than 
Department of Defense [DOD] scenarios for traditional-type war between national armed 
forces).14  The accepted focus was on sharply defined scenarios that could ensure future 
strategic and operational adaptability.  After 1990, DOD planners began to question 
everything from force size and objectives to the range of capabilities required, because of 
the changes in the threats to national security after the fall of the Soviet Union, the new 
range of prospective adversaries, and the need to operate efficiently with allotted funds. 
Their challenges have included the development and acquisition of military equipment; 
the training, and equipping of forces; and a cogent analysis of emerging national security 
objectives.    
The central challenge for DOD planners is to achieve plausible results under 
uncertainty.  To do so in the past, they have relied on TBP and SBP methodologies; now, 
however, the Department of Defense is moving toward the new capability-based planning 
methodology, which allows it to plan generally rather than specifically.  This ties in with 
an evolving vision for the military and goal for the future called full spectrum dominance:  
the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military 





14 Davis, Paul K., New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough. page 480, 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Publication MR-400-RC, 1994., p. 24. 
15 U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, May 13, 2004 retrieved January 11, 2005 
from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html page 20.  
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B. TRADITIONAL PLANNING 
Traditional military planning is founded on the SBP and TBP methodologies.  
The longstanding SBP approach, which focuses on one or several standard scenarios, 
makes little sense since the demise of the USSR, except for its managerial advantages 
during peacetime.  The possible range of scenarios has expanded beyond the ability of 
SBP to account for them.  The TBP methodology, for its part, is preeminent when threats 
are readily recognizable and identifiable. The planner would need to assume a reasonable 
threat situation, and then determine the amount of force needed to triumph.  This 
approach lends itself to dynamic and static modeling, and provides a quantifiable 
foundation for the recommended force structure. TBP asks the question: “Can the U.S. 
military succeed against this given threat?” 
The traditional military approaches to planning have merit, and have offered 
certain advantages to the first responder community with regard to emergency response 
preparedness.  Now, however, the military is transforming itself by using an approach 
that deals with capabilities rather than focusing on particular enemies. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States 
has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001.  Threats to the U.S. homeland will 
continue to be diverse and difficult to predict for the foreseeable future.  Since U.S. 
leaders cannot know with confidence which nation, combination of nations, or non-state 
actors will pose a threat in the future, planning and operations must focus on the ways a 
potential adversary could threaten the United States, that is, on the destructive mechanism 
and means of delivery, rather than on a specific adversary or adversaries.  Consequently, 
the DOD has adjusted its strategic and operational focus to encompass not only 
traditional military concerns posed by hostile states, but also possible asymmetric threats 
directed at the homeland by both stateless terrorists and hostile states. 
The National Military Strategy describes the strategic direction that the armed 
forces must follow to support the nation's security and defense strategies.16  It states that 
 
16 Ibid., Foreword page iii. 
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to be successful in protecting the United States against terrorists, the armed forces must 
be ready to transform themselves “in-stride” by fielding new capabilities and adopting 
new operational concepts.  
The newest methodology military planners are bringing to their work is a CBP 
strategy.  The difference between CBP and its forerunners is that traditional TBP focuses 
on the “whom” and SBP addresses the “what,” while CBP concerns the “how.”17  CBP is 
planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-
day challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic framework that 
necessitates choice.18  This planning strategy is most useful when threats are multifaceted 
and uncertain, and do not lend themselves to single SBP analysis.  By looking at the 
objective rather than at scenarios, CBP planners are able to focus on one or more specific 
opponents, and apply an appropriate mix of the required military capabilities.  The vision 
for the military and the goal for the future are what is known as full spectrum dominance:   
the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military 
operations.19      
 
17 Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Goss, Military Planner for Northern Command 
in the U.S. Army at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 6, 2004. 
18 Davis, Paul K. Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, 
 and Transformation, RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002, page xi. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PLANNING: (1) 
SCENARIO-BASED PLANNING (SBP)  
A. GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
Planning for homeland defense and homeland security can take many forms, 
depending on whether it is scenario-based, threat-based, or capabilities-based.  While 
these various types of planning share some aspects, each also has unique features that 
need to be understood if plans are to be effective.  This chapter and the two that follow 
describe in turn what these three methods are, how they work, and how in general they 
differ. 
The focus of SBP is on identifying and describing the most probable kinds of 
future operations the organization will face, and then developing a strategy and plans for 
a safe, successful, response.  SBP is reactive planning, typically formulated to develop 
credible solutions to prior known incidents and outcomes.  It is a method deliberately not 
of predicting the future but, rather, of developing response plans to different events that 
have a high potential for occurring because something like them has happened before.   
SBP attempts to develop appropriate solutions by looking at several alternative versions 
of possible incidents, any one of which may or may not occur.     
Once planners have formulated scenarios, they recommend a strategy and tactics, 
after which their plans undergo testing and evaluation.  This process results in a number 
of robust strategies that are sound and successful across several alternative scenario 
futures.  Planning and training with scenarios provides the organizations and groups 
using them with common terminology; promotes a heightened sensitivity among 
members to signs that a particular future is developing; and furnishes a set of critical 
indicators they can watch to determine which event or blend of futures is unfolding. 
The military provides a traditional SBP flow chart that depicts the steps involved 
in the SBP process.  As shown below in Figure 1, a specific planning scenario is first 
contemplated, after which it goes through the planning procedure until a final emergency 
response plan results.20  
 





Figure 1.   Scenario-based Planning Process 
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The goal of applying this scenario-development methodology to civilian operations has 
been to improve the odds of correctly predicting future emergency responses by allowing 
first responders to understand the driving forces affecting their organization's protocols 
and operations.  In this context, SBP seeks to assess and prepare for near certainties in the 
future, so that the first responder will be able to plan for operating in those anticipated 
environments and react to change as necessary.  The outcome of SBP is a compilation of 
distinct futures, all of which plausibly demand an emergency response by the 
organization.    
 
B. FIRST RESPONDER COMMUNITY 
The appropriate first responder plan for emergency preparedness and response is 
determined under SBP by calculating the response against a series of scenarios and 
scenario details.  This is the most common planning strategy presently used by first 
responders.  It concentrates on established emergency response missions for the fire 
service, the emergency medical community, law enforcement, offices of emergency 
management, and others, by describing an emergency situation that may have 
consequences greater than expected, but that are still reasonably realistic.  The given 
scenario combines a large amount of existing, real-world information with elements or 
assumptions already inherent in established plans, to put forward a limited number of 
contingency plans with appropriate responder actions.    
This planning technique examines important “What if…?” questions:  if “X” 
scenario happens, then the first responder’s plan will call for action “Y.”  The weakness 
of this method of planning involves hefty uncertainties in the scenario environment and 
in possible external influences on the first responder organization.  It allows no 
operational flexibility in its design for the planned scenario, according to how events 
actually unfold. 
SBP was most recently utilized during the 2004 Republican National Convention 
in New York City.21  Planners from various counterterrorism and emergency response 
agencies performed “what if” exercises and then joined together in coordinating a 
 
21 Information regarding the Republican National Convention 2004 was provided by Assistant Chief 
Harold Meyers of the FDNY at FDNY Headquarters on March 4, 2005. Chief Meyers was the FDNY 
representative and the agency’s Incident Commander. 
20 
planned response to different scenarios.  The area around Madison Square Garden, the 
venue of the convention, was designated a “frozen zone” and was tightly secured during 
the entire convention.  Only personnel who were credentialed by the Secret Service were 
allowed into this area.  A multi-agency command center was set up at the New York City 
Police Department’s (NYPD) headquarters located at 1 Police Plaza.  Representatives 
from all involved agencies were present at this command center.  Within the “frozen 
zone,” planners established a tactical operations center that comprised representatives 
from the FDNY, NYPD, New York City Transit, Secret Service, the FBI, medical 
representatives from the Health and Hospitals Corporation, and other responder and law 
enforcement agencies. 
If a chemical release were to occur inside the perimeter, a planned response 
scenario would ensue.  The WMD desk controlled by the FBI would gather intelligence 
on the event and where pertinent would immediately disseminate multi-agency 
notifications.  The federal counterterrorism agencies, along with the NYPD and the fire 
department's hazardous materials teams, would investigate the validity of the threat or 
occurrence.  A joint strike team composed of NYPD and federal agencies would stabilize 
the area against hostile actors.  The FDNY would provide decontamination and medical 
care to those civilians affected.  Once the area was stabilized against further danger from 
any enemy, then the FDNY would conduct hazardous material abatement.  Meanwhile, 
the FBI and NYPD would provide continual security to the area to ensure against any 
secondary occurrences.   
Decontamination and medical care would continue in the so-called "warm zone" 
where the attack had taken place.  Once victims were stabilized, they would be 
transported to nearby hospitals, which had been placed on high alert for the duration of 
the convention.  Once the situation was abated, NYPD and the Department of 
Environmental Protection would coordinate removal of the hazardous substances, based 
on evidentiary and chain-of-custody requirements, and disposed of accordingly.     
The advantage of the SBP strategy as illustrated above is that it is easily 
implemented and modified as necessary to fit selected scenarios. Scenarios are drafted to 
combine different possible outcomes for those situations that have been determined to be 
most influential.  These scenarios are then put together in a format that includes a 
21 
description of the desired end state and a tactical plan for the appropriate emergency 
response.   Any emergency response organization must ultimately be judged against some 
set of operational requirements – in other words, those things that first responders are 
expected to be able to do.  
First responder operational planning scenarios examine responses to different fire, 
civil emergency, medical, and criminal scenes.  They provide and encourage 
recommended actions and appropriate performance tasks, and positively convey complex 
events with corresponding tactics so these can easily be grasped and remembered by the 
first responder.  
FDNY planners using SBP first researched plausible incidents and tactical 
scenarios, and then developed appropriate plans and tactics for response through a multi-
step process (depicted in Figure 1) that had evolved over 140 years of service.  This long 
history has served the planning process well thus far.  In a changing environment, 
however, it could hinder successful planning for future uncertainty.  Scenario planning 
for the FDNY has not been about predicting the future but, rather, about describing 
possibilities under certain circumstances utilizing experienced personnel and senior 
leadership in the planning process.   
The benefits of scenario planning are that senior leadership are forced to break out 
of their standard worldview and, through developed scenarios, recognize blind spots they 
might otherwise have overlooked in the generally accepted forecast.  Fire department and 
other first responder leaders thus are better prepared and able to understand the source of 
disagreements among them that can often occur without their even realizing it, as they are 
envisioning their role in different scenarios.  Incident commanders and responders also 
will be better able to recognize a scenario in its early stages, should it be the one that 
actually unfolds.    
 
1. Example of the SBP Process 
The FDNY over the years developed many scenarios according to a well-defined 
set of conditions, and then determined the appropriate strategy and requirements for 
effective response. These results were then incorporated into the FDNY Official 
Publications and accepted as standard operating procedures.     
One example of the many scenarios developed and procedurally utilized in the 
FDNY is for a fire in the cellar of a two-story class 4 (wood), detached private dwelling.  
This is a probable future that the FDNY encounters regularly.  Once the scenario was 
envisioned, planners developed a strategy to deal with it, established requirements and 
reviewed protocol, and made adjustments as necessary.  The plan was then approved by 
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Figure 2.   Private Dwelling Cellar Fire   
 
Figure 2 illustrates a complete planning strategy for this particular fire scenario 
that was developed using SBP methodology.22  The set response to this type of incident 
requires four engine companies, two ladder companies, a FAST23 unit, and a battalion 
chief.  All these units will operate per the department’s standard operating procedures as 
depicted in Figure 2.     
                                                 
22 Information for this figure was obtained from the Fire Department of New York, "Fire Tactics and 
Procedures, Private Dwellings" on January 1, 2005.   




                                                
The standard operating procedures that have been developed utilizing scenarios 
have generally proved efficient for ensuring that the FDNY can provide an appropriate 
emergency response to most foreseeable circumstances.  The present first responder 
planning methodology also has limitations, however, and must change and adapt if it is to 
predict and plan for future emergency responses in a new environment that now includes 
terrorism.  
 
C. MILITARY SCENARIO-BASED PLANNING  
The accepted military approach using SBP is situationally driven, meaning that it 
measures the defense posture of our forces against a range of scenarios and scenario 
details.  The military plan would begin with a well-defined set of conditions at the 
national, theatre, regional, or global level and then assume problems or crisis.  The 
scenario setting should reflect a greater than expected, but reasonably realistic, menace.   
The completely developed scenario usually combines a large amount of current, real-
world information with elements of or assumptions about established plans.  These often 
include warning and mobilization times, force levels, and where appropriate, military 
campaign intentions.  
The SBP method was utilized, for instance, in planning for a possible war in 
North Korea.24  Planners from the military performed “what if” exercises, that is, they 
defined a set of conditions and then assumed problems or crises, to coordinate responses 
to different scenarios.  The scenarios they developed ranged from conflict with adequate 
warning, to operations for a forced-entry (invasion) situation.      
If a conflict with adequate warning were to occur, then the military would first 
address the possible danger to regional allies who might be a target of aggression, by 
conducting holding operations to protect key areas.  Strategic bombers would carry out 
blunt armor attack and hit air bases and armies.  Special operations forces would go in to 
secure key points, provide necessary reconnaissance, and conduct diverse support 
operations.  Ground-based air defenses would defend key airports and seaports, other 
important areas, and theater air space.  Light infantry would defend key airports and 
seaports, and other important facilities.  Air defense aircraft also would defend important 
 
24 Davis, New Challenges for Defense Planning, page 177.  
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areas, as well as attack enemy air forces.  Surveillance and battle-management aircraft 
would support defensive operations, and aid counter-air operations.    
The scenario approach to military planning as illustrated above has three clear 
strengths.  The first is its specific and tangible focus.  If the scenario is conventional (no 
use or threat of use of WMD), then fairly accurate planning can be undertaken once 
planners develop their major hypotheses.  If simultaneous scenarios are anticipated, then 
even more specific planning can result.  Finally, because of its dynamic nature, SBP 
encourages the recognition of clear priorities by requiring that some areas be considered 
more important than others.  
SBP has been used regularly in the military. According to a study by the RAND 
Corporation of defense planning issues for the post-Cold War era, “Analysts, like 
generals, often spend much of their time planning for the last war.”25  In the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War, for instance, the United States engaged in planning based on previous 
incidents and scenarios projected to occur again.  The military would undertake a war 
game with a single team playing both the blue (the United States and its allies) and red 
(the appropriate U.S. adversaries) teams.  The red team would first devise scenarios for 
success against the United States and would be briefed on the outcome of strategies that 
played to U.S. strengths.  Its members were then asked to formulate creative approaches 
that did not cater to those strengths.  The players then switched over to the role of the 
blue team and developed responses to the various scenarios and threats they themselves 
had postulated.    
 
D. SUMMARY 
The SBP type of planning strategy is very simple to implement and has been 
tailored to particular types of response based on pre-selected historical and contemporary 
circumstances.  Planners configure scenarios and their many variables based on 
assumptions they have obtained through past experience, along with knowledge they 
have gained during the process of development.    
The SBP process has long been applied by the military and first responder 
community for standard missions, and can also be useful for many future planning 
 
25 Davis, New Challenges for Defense Planning, page 477. 
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requirements.  There are, however, important limitations to the SBP methodology's 
usefulness, because the world rarely conforms to planners’ expectations.  SBP requires 
assurances about possible scenarios and is limited in its ability to cope with the number 
of scenarios possible in this age of domestic and transnational terrorism.    
Another weakness of this planning methodology is that it produces plans only for 
the contingency scenarios selected, thereby limiting the scope of plans to those situations 
planners have considered worth pursuing.  After all the work involved in planning the 
scenarios, there is a natural reluctance on the part of their creators not to dispute their 
basic underlying principles as they relate to other scenarios.  Therefore, key assumptions 
may become fixed ideas, and hypotheses may be treated as fact.  SBP tends to be directed 
at the past, reliving old crises rather than exploring new challenges. Napoleon Bonaparte 
once noted that “the biggest mistake a General can make is to paint an imaginary picture 
and believe it to be true.”26  Planners and response personnel can be blinded by the 
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V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PLANNING: (2) 
THREAT-BASED PLANNING (TBP)  
A. GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
TBP is a planning methodology that involves identifying potential threats and the 
possibility for occurrence, and assessing the needed response capability.  It is menace-
driven, which means that the strategy focuses on countering the most capable and likely 
threats – the specific threat of the present.  TBP seeks to optimize response against 
specific danger. 
The task when planning for a viable threat is to make reasonable assumptions 
based on reliable intelligence, in order to develop the appropriate threat scenario.  Once 
the scenario is developed, the required response to the danger must be determined, 





























Figure 3 shows the flow and progression of the TBP process.  It begins with 
receipt of credible intelligence that can be used to define a set of necessary planning 
requirements.  Once planners have identified these requirements, they propose methods 
for attaining them and finally develop a response plan.  A risk assessment then tests the 
validity of the plan.  On completion of the risk assessment, officials approve the final 
contingency plan, which is adopted as standard operating procedure for the threat at hand.   
The TBP approach lends itself to lively and adaptable modeling and provides 
immediate justification for the recommended response, answering the question of 
whether or not the organization can provide a suitable solution.  The disadvantage of the 
TBP process appears to be the difficulty of determining what represents a valid threat.  
TBP is situationally reactive and timely, when it can rely on early identification and 
immediate awareness, but it frequently creates difficulty when there is a need to adapt to 
sudden changes in the environment. 
 
B. FIRST RESPONDERS 
The TBP methodology is preeminent when threats to the first responder’s region 
are easily recognizable and identifiable.  Prior to the rise of terrorism in the United States, 
the threats that first responders most often encountered were in the form of severe 
weather conditions and other natural disasters, combative individuals, arson, personal 
injury, and the like.  These traditional threats could be easily recognized and identified.  
Now, however, the threat arena for the fire service and others in the first responder 
community has changed to include the unpredictable acts of terrorism. 
With known threats, the first responder plans and responds appropriately with 
emergency personnel and equipment, using approved tactics.  This type of approach 
focuses contingency planning on a single threat or a combination of dangers based on 
recognized information.  The strength of this method is its focus on emergency 
preparedness and response for a particular threat at a particular point in time.   It helps 
remind senior leaders of first responder organizations that capabilities are important for 
the emergency response and consequence management mission.  It forces the 
organization to consider serious threat assessments so they can devise realistic 
contingency plans. 
29 
                                                
The clearest example of a TBP-based strategy for first responders was evident 
after September 11th, 2001, when anthrax attacks, using letters mailed through the regular 
postal system, occurred over the course of several weeks beginning September 18, 2001.   
Most of these anthrax-contaminated letters were sent to news media outlets in the New 
York City area, including ABC News, NBC News, CBS News, and the New York Post.  
A note in the New York Post letter read, “09-11-01, THIS IS NEXT, TAKE PENACILIN 
(sic) NOW, DEATH TO AMERICA, DEATH TO ISRAEL, ALLAH IS GREAT.”27  
The threat was well-defined:  letters containing two different strains of anthrax bacteria 
were being delivered through the mail. 
There was widespread panic throughout the city, and emergency response for 
feared and actual anthrax incidents soared.  To respond to this threat, leading fire 
department officials immediately devised a TBP strategy:  Fire department units first on 
the scene were to assess the situation, and if the threat was potentially viable then they 
were directed to evacuate and quarantine the area, and segregate those exposed.  A Joint 
FDNY/NYPD HAMMER TEAM then would respond to confirm the likelihood of 
anthrax.28  If they determined the likelihood to be minor, this unit would stabilize and 
remove the package for further testing.     
This and many other threats occur in real time, and organizations must plan 
quickly to respond effectively to them.  The FDNY used a TBP strategy to formulate an 
immediate and adequate response for the consequence management of this type of event 
(threat of anthrax dissemination), without unnecessarily sacrificing its limited and 
specialized resources.  The TBP ensured that the department’s Hazardous Materials unit 
would not become overwhelmed with false alarms generated by the ensuing panic.  By 
focusing resources, the plan also provided for superior hazardous materials abatement.  
There was no further contamination, injury, or damage that occurred as a result of actions 




27 Wikipedia Encyclopedia, "2001 Anthrax Attacks," page 1, retrieved February 2, 2005, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_anthrax_attack. 
28 A HAMMER TEAM during this crisis originally comprised Hazardous Materials Technician 
components from the FDNY and NYPD. 
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C. MILITARY 
The DOD has consistently assessed the nation’s security program in terms of how 
many wars could be fought concurrently.  It has geared defense programs to fight two and 
a half wars (1960s), one and a half wars (1970s), a multi-front global war with the Soviet 
Union (1980s), and lately, two "major regional contingencies."29  The TBP approach 
involves recognizing potential adversaries and evaluating their capabilities.  The point of 
departure is often an assessment of the balance of capabilities between adversaries.  
Recent changes to the security environment make the TBP approach to planning more 
difficult than it was during the Cold War. 
The strength of TBP is that it focuses individual contingency plans on individual 
enemies, based on known information about the threats they pose, while also taking into 
account both the comprehensive balance of power, and the specific conflict situation.  
The TBP approach, which seeks to optimize U.S. forces against a specific threat, reminds 
strategists and military planners that capabilities are important and count in warfare. This 
knowledge requires them to perform in-depth assessments and devise realistic scenarios.    
This planning methodology was prevalent during the Cold War, when U.S. 
defense planning was dominated by the threat from the Soviet Union.  It was also used 
during planning for the confrontations in Iraq, where intelligence on the opponent’s 
strengths and weakness was available to researchers and analysts, who were able to 
compile a realistic threat profile and formulate a plan of attack.30  This planning 
methodology has proved exceptionally useful for planning against a state opponent 
because threats tend to be slow moving, obvious, and understandable.  The drawback to 
TBP is the difficulty in determining what represents a valid threat.  The U.S. military is 
superior to all others in conventional warfare and presently is the only superpower in the 
world.  Nation-state adversaries will not directly attack the United States because they 
know that the chance of success is small. 
The TBP methodology is essentially incident-reactive and timely, which means 
planners could have difficulty adapting to sudden changes in the threat environment.   
 
29 Davis, Paul K., Gompert, David and Kugler, Richard “Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis 
of a New Framework,” RAND Corporation Publication IP 155, 1996, retrieved June 16, 2004 from 
http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP155.  
30  Ibid. 
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The TBP strategy is prejudiced toward quantitative data, such as numbers of people, units 
of energy, or types and quantities of weapon systems.  These figures can, however, be 
misleading and over-reliance on them might cause analysts to overlook, underrate, or 
overestimate important qualitative factors like experience, leadership, morale, or strategy.   
With the TBP methodology, the DOD has used point-threat scenarios as test cases 
for planning, because TBP provides a single, simple yardstick against which to measure 
the adequacy of U.S. forces.  While this procedure is relatively easy to explain and thus is 
useful to gain support from lawmakers, especially when threats are authentic and clear, 
too often, the threats on which it bases its results are vague and lack credibility.  
 
D. SUMMARY 
The pitfall of the TBP strategy for emergency responders is the difficulty in 
determining what constitutes a valid threat, especially in large metropolises like New 
York City, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles.  TBP is inherently reactive, and 
responders who rely on it could have great difficulty in adapting to sudden changes in the 
environment.  Furthermore, like SBP it retains a bias toward responding to threats that are 
known, but is unable to address all the emerging unknowns. 
The myriad of unpredictable, asymmetrical threats have profound implications for 
defense planning.  Terrorism – the strategy of the weak against the strong – is an 
asymmetric strategy.  This reality has compelled responders to shift from a TBP 
methodology that addresses the symmetric enemy, to a CBP strategy that addresses 
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VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PLANNING: (3) 
CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING (CBP)  
A. GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
CBP is increasingly being used by the military to develop capability plans for a 
robust defense force to meet designated objectives. Using CBP, planners assess existing 
defense capabilities according to real-world needs, and then offer a comprehensive plan 
for the best way to allocate limited resources among the required capabilities.  Thus CBP 
represents a flexible and cost- effective basis for planning.    
CBP differs from the Cold War-era SBP and TBP methods used by the military 
and first responders up to now.  CBP is planning under uncertainty, in order to provide 
capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances, while 
working within a budgetary framework that necessitates choice.31  It is a planning 
strategy that encourages innovation. It provides a good basis for making future decisions, 
while making planning more responsive to risk, uncertainty, and economic limitations 
than other forms of planning.  CBP lowers the threshold of concern by allowing a 
collection of future possible and theoretical threats to be ranked by importance.  Defense 





31 Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, xi. 
32 Ibid. 
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Figure 4.   Capabilities-based Planning Concept   
  
 Figure 4 is a depiction of the CBP concept by which an organization with limited 
funding seeks and acquires the necessary capabilities to respond to different challenges.  
CBP is a universal planning approach designed to identify the most appropriate options 
required to meet present and future priorities.  In essence, a given capability is tested 
against several scenarios, and the result used to determine the kinds of capability actually 
required in each type of situation.  CBP, then, concentrates on what is to be accomplished 
and how it will be achieved, rather than on limiting options according to existing 
equipment, personnel, and organizational structures.    
When CBP is properly implemented, one of the key benefits lies in its ability to 
help take the focus away from individual missions.  CBP identifies the levels of 
capability needed to achieve an overall strategic goal, lack of which has been a common 
problem across many disciplines.33  CBP satisfies strategic goals and requirements for the 
organization using chosen scenarios to derive necessary capabilities, and appears to be 
most efficient for considering responses to acts of terrorism. 
          
 
33 The Technical Cooperation Program, Joint Systems and Analysis Group Technical Panel 3, “Guide 




























                                                
B. FIRST RESPONDERS AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
 Homeland security became a top priority for U.S. leaders after the events of 
September 11, 2001. A "National Preparedness Goal" was developed with the objective 
of strengthening the preparedness of the first responder community and the nation as a 
whole.  This objective, is expected to be accomplished by building an appropriate blend 
of homeland security capabilities and measuring them against unyielding standards.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) establishes policies to 
prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies.34  This directive requires the Office of State and 
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness to provide state, tribal, and local 
jurisdictions with final guidance on nationally accepted preparedness capabilities in the 
first three months of 2005.35  HSPD-8 also outlines requirements for national 
preparedness to “all hazards,” which include disaster, emergency, and terrorism 
preparedness.  It requires the establishment of a national all-hazards preparedness goal 
that sets the standards for preparedness across all mission areas, and delineates a 
minimum acceptable level of capabilities to respond to emergencies.36  
CBP is designed to provide information about the capabilities needed at different 
levels of government to prevent, respond to, and recover from incidents of terrorism or 
natural and other disasters.  It supplies an important piece of a common national 
readiness model, and a combined national readiness perspective.37  This method will 
allow all jurisdictions and responders to know what resources they need to reach optimal 
preparedness, so they can make knowledgeable choices about using scarce resources in 
order to achieve a reasonable level of preparedness.  CBP is designed to involve all levels 
of emergency response and preparedness from government to first responder 
organizations.  This is a shared effort to develop and implement a national approach to 
preparedness.  
34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: “National 
Preparedness Implementation Status Overview," NEMA Midyear Conference, September 2004, page 2, 
retrieved February 26, 2005 from http://www.nemaweb.org/?1084. 
35 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness (DHS/SLGCP), Questions and Answers from "Capabilities Workshop," October 12-14, 2004, 
Washington, D.C., page 2. 
36 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. 
37 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Questions and Answers from "Capabilities Workshop." 
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National Planning Scenarios were prepared by the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness using the CBP process because large scale attacks exceed the ability of 
most jurisdictions and responders to deal with them.  Therefore, preparedness involves 
the capacity to prevent, respond to, and recover from large-scale incidents, and to identify 
a range of potential events for which the nation must prepare. 
The National Planning scenarios were developed by experts from the homeland 
security community, to define a range of probable large scale threats and hazards for 
which the first responder community needs to be prepared.  The defined scenarios do not 
address every possible event, but rather are the least of what first responders should 
prepare for and be expected to respond to; they thus serve as a planning tool from which 
tasks and capabilities can be developed.38  These scenarios illustrate the need for planners 
at all levels to make effective decisions and to ensure that limited resources will be used 
effectively in enhancing preparedness. 
The CBP process is designed to provide the first responder community with 
information to make informed decisions about how best to build and maintain the 
capabilities needed for prevention, response, and recovery from acts of terrorism, natural 
disasters and other large-scale events.  CBP helps enhance preparedness by building a 
network of capabilities throughout the country that can be brought together when needed, 
thus reducing the burden to any one jurisdiction. 
The involvement of agencies and organizations from all levels of government and 
the private sector is critical for first responders to build the capacity to prevent, respond 
to, and recover from a range of large-scale events as well as smaller events.  The National 
Preparedness Goal mandated by HSPD-8 will be met by achieving target levels of 
capability based upon national priorities or preparedness objectives.  The purpose of the 
directive is to realign existing strategies, goals, objectives, and implementation steps for 
entities at all levels of government, and thereby establish a national approach toward 
improving preparedness.39  Responders and jurisdictions will decide what capabilities 
they need to enhance their own preparedness, but many emerging threats and hazards are 
 
38 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Questions and Answers from "Capabilities Workshop." 
39 Ibid. 
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national in scope, and the adoption of a national preparedness strategy, especially with 
regard to threats and acts of terrorism, is vital to our nation’s security. 
The National Homeland Security Strategy directs first responders to make 
difficult choices about resources allocation so they will be able to protect the most people 
and critical assets with the assets they have.  There are presently fifteen National 
Planning Scenarios, defined as the threats and hazards that present the greatest national 
risk, for which all jurisdictions and first responders must be prepared and have the 
capabilities to respond.40  They are as follows: 
1) Explosive Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device 
2) Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
3) Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion 
4) Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax 
5) Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent 
6) Chemical Attack – Blister Agent 
7) Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersion Devices 
8) Biological Attack – Plague 
9) Biological Attack – Food Contamination 
10) Nuclear Attack – Improvised Nuclear Device 
11) Cyber Attack  
12) Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease) 
13) Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake 
14) Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane 
15) Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza 
 
C. MILITARY CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING  
A secure homeland is the nation’s first priority and is fundamental to the 
successful execution of the nation’s military strategy.41  Threats to the United States will 
be diverse and not easy to predict in this changing environment where terrorism has 
 
40 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List: Version 1.0, Office of State and 
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, January 31, 2005, page 2, retrieved March 1, 2005 from 
http://mmrs.fema.gov/Main/Events/Target%20Capabilities%20List-Version%201.0.pdf.  
41 U.S. Department of Defense, “Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept” February 2004, page 9, 
received December 1, 2004 from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/hls_joc_v1.doc. 
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emerged as the weapon of choice for some of the country's enemies.  To meet 
responsibilities associated with securing the homeland, DOD must simultaneously defend 
the national territory, provide civil support to civil authorities as directed, and help 
prepare for emergencies.42  
The United States faces a range of state and non-state threats to its security.  
There are hostile states equipped with conventional and strategic capabilities and non-
state terrorist groups who seek unconventional weapons.  In order to meet the 
responsibilities associated with securing the homeland, the military is transforming the 
way that it plans.  SBP was good for evaluating past occurrences and as a support of other 
planning methodologies; however, the results of SBP are strongly influenced by arbitrary 
assumptions that are the result of compromise.  The TBP approach is also limited by its 
reliance on the known, and does little to guard against adversaries who would like to 
exploit the standard planning approaches presently used by the DOD.  The transformation 
underway is concerned with changing the military culture into one that encourages 
innovation and intelligent risk-taking.   The overall goal is to produce a better military by 
redefining how planning is performed and wars fought.43   
A few important new directions for the DOD were set forth in the latest 
Quadrennial Defense Review report.  It calls for the military to move away from the "two 
major theater wars" force planning construct, and to adopt a new framework for assessing 
risk.   This new planning method will shift from the most recent “threat-based” model to 
a “capabilities-based” model that will more accurately determine the nation's strategic 
and operational challenges, and the best means to address them.44
Achieving the objectives of the National Military Strategy 2004 in an uncertain 
and complex environment requires a CBP approach to force design and planning that 
focuses less on a specific adversary or the location of a conflict, and more on how an 
adversary might fight.45  Far from assuming threat or uncertainty to be irrelevant, 
 
42 U.S. Department of Defense, “Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept” February 2004, page 9, 
received December 1, 2004 from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/hls_joc_v1.doc. 
43 Davis et al., “Adaptiveness in National Defense," page 2. 
44 Quadrennial Defense Review, page 4. 
45  U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, 13 May 2004. Government Printing 
 Office, 2004, Washington, DC, page 3, retrieved January 11, 2005: 
 http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html.  
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however, CBP seeks to manage the risk and allow for variation.  The CBP approach uses 
operating concepts to drive planning and to guide the development of capabilities.  It 
ensures that joint forces can adapt and succeed across a broad range of scenarios.  This 
approach must anticipate and rapidly adjust to changes in the security environment to 
ensure that the United States improves its qualitative advantage over a more diverse set of 
adversaries now and in the future. 
The DOD intends CBP to be a core concept in its future planning as directed in 
the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.  Since U.S. leaders do not know with confidence 
which nation, combination of nations, or non-state actor(s) will pose a threat, DOD must 
focus planning and operations on how a potential adversary could threaten the United 
States, rather than on the identity of a specific adversary.46  To manage the difference in 
defining the problem and in developing the solutions with resource constraints requires a 
system of capable and ongoing identification and assessment of risk.  To win the global 
war on terror, the U.S. armed services must be flexible, light and agile, “so that they can 
respond quickly to sudden changes in the world.”47
 
D. SUMMARY 
 Terrorism has emerged over the last decade or so as a serious threat to the United 
States.  First responders not only must be ready to deal with millions of medical needs, 
fires, emergencies, and law enforcement incidents throughout our nation on a daily basis, 
but must also have the capabilities to plan effective responses. Furthermore, planners 
have to provide for the health and safety of the first responders as they carry out their 
missions.  CBP appears to be the planning solution required by the first responder 






46 U.S. Department of Defense, Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept, February 2004, page 2, 
retrieved December 1, 2004 from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/hls_joc_v1.doc. 
47 Garamone, Jim, American Forces Press, “Rumsfeld Tells Congress Changes Needed to Increase 







































Figure 5.   Capabilities-based Planning Process. 
 
 Figure 5 above illustrates the CBP process.48  An organization possesses certain 
“as-is” capabilities that are fundamental to it.  CBP evaluates target capabilities according 
to the organization’s missions and tasks and the various scenarios and concepts it is likely 
to encounter.  Once planners identify the desired capabilities, they will be able to 
highlight existing gaps, excesses, and deficiencies, and thus enable the organization to 
meet its necessary “to-be” capability requirements. 
 CBP appears to be an efficient way to prepare for possible large-scale terrorist 
attacks, with their many unknowns and uncertainties.  It allows first responders to take 
into account scarce resources so that the organization can make logical choices and set 
priorities.  CBP is an excellent tool for planning for the vast scope of potential terrorist 
40 
                                                 
48 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: “National 
Preparedness Implementation Status Overview," NEMA Midyear Conference, September 2004, page 6, 
retrieved February 26, 2005 from http://www.nemaweb.org/?1084.  
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attacks.  Combined with the traditional first responder SBP and TBP planning strategies, 
CBP will enhance the ability of the first responder community to plan and respond 
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VII. FIRST RESPONDER PLANNING METHODOLOGY FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. REASON FOR A NEW PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
Homeland security has become a core mission at all levels of government from 
emergency response to law enforcement agencies.  The vague and varied nature of 
terrorism poses a particular problem for personnel in the fire service and other agencies in 
the first responder community who are responsible for contingency planning for 
emergency response and preparedness.  Planning and resource development is made more 
difficult because it requires effective coordination at every level of the first responder 
organization and between others throughout the first responder community. 
First responder organizations carry out contingency planning under the rubric of 
“preparedness.” The National Response Plan recognizes the critical nature of planning 
and defines this important purpose, thus: 
Preparedness: The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities 
necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. 
Preparedness is a continuous process. Preparedness involves efforts at all 
levels of government and between government and private sector and 
nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine 
vulnerabilities, and identify required resources.49
Preparedness provides for adequate first responder planning for emergency 
response by requiring that organizations have the necessary information needed to 
develop appropriate tactics and procedures for future contingencies. The dilemma facing 
the fire service and others in the first responder community is the need to develop 
contingency plans that will utilize existing capabilities in an effective manner for the 
homeland security missions.  Preparedness, therefore, for first responders is to be able to 
implement effective actions at the appropriate time and place, to achieve successful 
consequence management for the many varied events. 
Until recently, first responder planning focused on the need to deal with any 
viable fire, health, emergency, or law enforcement incident that the organization would or 
 
49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Response Plan, Final Coordination Draft, August 
2004, page 71. 
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could encounter.  Planners limited themselves to the different scenarios that were most 
likely to be encountered, so that they could ensure future strategic and operational 
effectiveness.  For traditional and routine missions, this detailed planning has served to 
ensure optimal operational effectiveness, and must not be sacrificed now or in the future.  
However, because this method is so detailed, it prevents the first responder organization 
from preparing for a full spectrum of events, including response to acts of terrorism. 
The vital challenge for the first responder community is planning under 
uncertainty.  As discussed previously, first responders have used several different 
planning methodologies characterized by SBP and TBP.  Although these approaches 
were adequate to plan for traditional emergencies, it is clear that they display individual 
planning weaknesses that make them ineffective in the current homeland security setting.    
The weakness of SBP lies in deep uncertainties in the scenarios it relies on, and in 
the external influences on the first responder organization.  SBP has focused on the 
requirements for standard scenarios, and does little to improve plans and capabilities 
according to a much wider scope of possible scenarios.  In reality, the world rarely 
conforms to planners’ expectations.  Furthermore, after planners have gone to all the 
work of developing the chosen scenarios, they may naturally be reluctant to question their 
work's basic underlying principles as those principles relate to other scenarios.  In other 
words, the established scenarios tend to take on a life of their own:  key assumptions may 
become fixed ideas, and hypotheses may be treated as fact.  SBP ultimately tends to be 
directed at the past, reliving old crises rather than exploring new challenges.  
The flaw of the TBP process, for its part, appears to be the difficulty of 
determining what represents a valid threat. An organization must be able to recognize and 
characterize preeminent threats in order for this methodology to be successful. TBP is 
situationally reactive and timely, depending on early identification and immediate 
awareness.  This planning methodology also has difficulty adapting to sudden changes in 
the security environment, but it is superior to SBP when threats are real and clear.  If, 
however, this is not the case, plans might not be able to deal with sudden changes in the 
security environment. 
CBP is a universal planning approach that provides a generic menu of necessary 
capabilities for planners.  The weakness of this method when used alone is that first 
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responders will most often be contending with well-known traditional contingencies that 
require more specific planning for effective response than CBP can offer.  The military 
emphasized this methodology after the Cold War because there was no longer a distinct 
or identifiable enemy like the Soviet Union to plan against. The one constant in the first 
responder community, by contrast, is that it will continue to respond to the kinds of 
distinct traditional threats and missions for which specific planning is necessary. CBP 
moves the focus of planning away from obvious and common missions and the routine 
response toward more general capabilities for various generic responses.           
The new first responder planning methodology proposed in this thesis requires 
anticipating and planning for future needs, with better management of the strategies and 
initiatives that are necessary for successful full spectrum response. This includes 
developing, expanding, and updating procedures and exchanging operational information 
within the first responder community.  It also involves improving the ability to assess 
risks and threats, and to plan accordingly in order to create effective response plans while 
prioritizing training and investments in new resources. 
The need for better planning for the future is evident throughout the fire service 
and the rest of the first responder community.  The FDNY Chief of Department stated: 
“One of this administration’s primary concerns is to assess how we chart a new direction 
for the future and still maintain our traditional core values of service, bravery, safety, 
honor, dedication and preparedness."50  This was apparent to others in the Department, as 
well.  According to Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta: “The disaster demonstrated 
the need for us to increase our capabilities in certain areas.  Within a few hours, the 
threats to our world had become exponentially more complex.  The Fire Department, in 





50 Fire Department City of New York, Strategic Plan 2004-2005, “Message From the Chief of   
Department, Frank P. Cruthers,” January 2004. 
51 Fire Department City of New York, Strategic Plan 2004-2005, “Message From the Fire 
Commissioner, Honorable Nicholas Scoppetta,” January 2004. 
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B. FOUNDATION OF PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
This proposed first responder planning methodology for homeland security will 
evaluate reasonable strategies without losing sight of the safety of the first responder, 
within limited budgets.  It must effectively deal with the customary range of responses, 
immediate threats, and other asymmetrical acts of terrorism, for future emergency 
preparedness planning.  A new first responder planning methodology for homeland 
security necessitates crossing all planning boundaries. It needs to include the traditional 
SBP and TBP strategies while incorporating CBP for future efficient response.  This new 
strategy will: 
 Assess capability options for effectiveness in operations 
 Identify a menu of capability needs 
 Make requirement choices, and devise ways to achieve success 
 Provide for first responder safety in response and operations 
 Provide continued effective response for routine emergency missions 
 Allow for response to immediate threats 
 Provide an adequate response to acts of terrorism 
 Provide an integrated framework to addresses future emergency 
preparedness and response, and risk tradeoffs 
 Allow for adaptable planning with a limited budget. 
The fusion of the three planning strategies into an all-inclusive methodology allows the 
first responder community to continue to plan for traditional missions and present threats, 
and at the same time develop future homeland security scenarios within organizational 
budgets. 
Figure 6 shows how the three planning methodologies support and complement 
each other, while crossing all planning boundaries and limitations:  the strength of each 
individual planning methodology makes up for the weakness of the accompanying 
methods.  The result is a stronger, more adaptable planning methodology for present and 
future use than those available before terrorism became such a national threat.  It also 
allows a layered level of planning for asymmetrical threats and other contingencies. 
CBP  
     Homeland Security 
              Response 
 
 
          Asymmetric  
             Threats 
          Traditional       Immediate  





Figure 6.   Foundation of the New First Responder Planning Methodology 
 
CBP provides a complete assessment of the capabilities needed for overall 
emergency response and preparedness by the organization, and lends a broader 
worldview to planning.  First responder organizations require a menu of capabilities in 
order to be successful in response within a limited economic framework.  SBP provides 
for concentrated planning, and is used to develop necessarily detailed response and 
operational plans for common traditional missions. TBP is concerned with the present, 
allowing the first responder organization to prepare in depth for acknowledged threats 
that are discernable in real time.  It, along with CBP, is necessary for overall planning for 
future consequence management of contingencies involving terrorism and homeland 
security.     
 
C. GOAL AND PURPOSE OF PLANNING  
The vision and goal of this new first responder planning methodology is to allow 
the fire service and the rest of the first responder community to prepare for full spectrum 
emergency response preparedness.  This is the ability to plan for, control, and adequately 
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respond to any and all emergency situations that an organization might encounter.  A 
superior response to the vast range of contingencies likely to confront the first responder 
community demands that first responders transform their planning to focus on key 
capability areas.  The DHS presently requires the first responder community to develop 
joint first responder capabilities, operating concepts, functional theories and critical 
enablers that are adaptable to the diverse conditions surrounding response.  
Full Spectrum Emergency Response Preparedness (FSERP) for the fire service 
and the first responder community recognizes the need, first of all, to identify and 
integrate all emergency response activities, including responses to acts of terrorism.  The 
first responder community’s missions and objectives are wide in scope and are not all- 
inclusive.    
 







   Homeland Security 
  *Explosive Attack 
  *Chemical Attack 
  *Biological Attack 
  *Radiological Attack 
   *Nuclear Attack 
   *Cyber Attack 
   *    Natural Disaster 
   *Disease Outbreak 
  Traditional Missions 
  *Police 
  *Firefighter 
  *Public Health Agencies        
  *Hospitals 
  *Emergency Medical   
     Services 
   *Emergency Management   
      Agencies 
 
    Immediate Threats 
   *Agency Specific 
   *Regional Intelligence 
   *National Intelligence 
    (Homeland Security     
      Threat Advisory) 
Figure 7.   First Responder Mission Spectrums  
 
As Figure 7 shows, there are three distinct spectrums of contingencies for which 
organizations within the first responder community need to be prepared:  1) traditional 
response – first responders must continue to provide effective response to their traditional 
and most common missions; 2) immediate threats – they must be able to respond to the 
timely and immediate threats of the present, using appropriate intelligence; and 3) 
homeland security – responders must establish and maintain the necessary capabilities for 
future response to acts of terrorism and other homeland security missions.  Developing 
emergency response mission spectrums for first responder organizations is important to 
fulfilling FSERP requirement, and is integral to this new planning methodology.  
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Planners then need to break the three mission areas down into the specific contingencies 
that might be encountered within these broader categories. 
A written spectrum of potential contingencies must be prepared by every first 
responder organization, and recorded in a Spectrum of Potential Contingencies table, 
illustrated by Table 1. 
 













HOMELAND SECURITY       
A1   B1 
 
C1  
A2  B2  C2  
A3  B3  C3  
A4  B4  C4  
A5  B5  C5  
A6  B6  C6  
A7  B7  C7  
A8  B8  C8  
A9  B9  C9  
A10  B10  C10  
    C11  
    C12  
    C13  
    C14  
    C15  
Table 1 shows how the spectrums of potential contingencies that a first responder 
organization might face would be laid out.  The three mission columns are ranked left to 
right according to the potential frequency of encounter.  Spectrum A would contain 
contingencies that will be encountered routinely, the traditional missions of the first 
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responder organization.  Spectrum B contingencies may be encountered less frequently, 
but represent the real-time security threats of the present.  First responders are to develop 
and implement preparedness measures as appropriate utilizing the Fire and Emergency 
Services Preparedness Guidelines.  Spectrum C contingencies are rare, but still fall under 
DHS recommendations for preparedness. 
While this full spectrum emergency response assessment directs preparedness 
planners to the most likely threats, it also illustrates other, less likely threats that may 
occur just the same.  Threats are ranked in each of the spectrum columns, from the most 
frequent likely occurrence (1) at the top, to the less frequent in descending order. It is 
important to note that “frequency” is not related to the severity of the consequences of an 
event.  This illustrates the likelihood of occurrence for the first responder organization, 
and is a tool to assess a potential emergency response, for which the first responder 
organization requires specific capabilities to carry out effectively.  This contingency 
menu will require modification according to the demands of the ever-changing 
emergency response environment.   
Spectrum A contingencies account for the majority of organizational responses 
annually, and will continue to demand detailed planning if first responder organizations 
are to ensure they will be able to respond effectively.  By contrast, an organization would 
need regularly to adjust the assessed probability for threats illustrated in spectrum B 
based on intelligence or perceived changes in vulnerabilities (for example, during a 
special event), or elevation of the homeland security threat advisory level.  
The homeland security and national preparedness response contingencies that 
make up spectrum C must be addressed by each organization because of their potential to 
occur during a terrorist attack.  According to DHS recommendations, all jurisdictions and 
first responders must be prepared for these national planning scenarios and acquire the 
necessary capabilities to respond.  These threats and hazards, which are of national 
significance with high credibility, consequence, and probability, provide the design basis 
for national preparedness goals, emergency responder capability requirements, and 
implementation of the National Response Plan. 
 
While greatly oversimplified, the graph illustrated by Table 1 offers a clear 
enough assessment of the threat for planners to identify and develop the defensive lines 
of operation and cross-cutting capabilities they will need to counter threats to homeland 
security. 
 













HOMELAND SECURITY   
RESPONSE 
A1 Larceny B1 Domestic Violence 
 
C1 Explosive Attack 
A2 Breaking or Entering B2 Rioting C2 Industrial Chemical Attack 
A3 Aggravated Assault B2 Drug Trafficking C3 Chlorine Tank Explosion 
A4 Motor Vehicle Theft B3 Murder for Hire C4 Aerosol Anthrax 
A5 Robbery B4 Hostage Situation C5 Nerve Agent 
A6 Forcible Rape B5 Bomb Threat C6 Blister Agent 
A7 Murder  Homeland Security Threat 
Advisory52
C7 Radiological Dispersion Device 
A8 Illegal Drugs B6 Low Condition – Green C8 Plague 
  B7 Guarded Condition – Blue C9 Food Contamination 
  B8 Elevated Condition – Yellow C10 Nuclear Device – Improvised 
  B9 High Condition – Orange C11 Cyber Attack 
  B10 Severe Condition – Red C12 Foreign Animal Disease 
    C13 Major Earthquake 
    C14 Major Hurricane 
    C15 Pandemic Influenza 
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52 Department of Homeland Security’s Threat Advisory System represents an increasing risk of 
terrorist attacks.  First responders are to develop and implement preparedness measures as appropriate, 
according to the Fire and Emergency Services Preparedness Guidelines. 
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         An illustration of a potential contingency assessment can be seen in Table 2.  This 
is a general illustration of the spectrums of potential contingencies for a law enforcement 
organization.  The table of potential contingencies depicts the different spectrums this 
organization will encounter, from column A, the most frequent, to the less frequent 
column C. Within each spectrum the contingencies are ranked in descending importance, 
from 1 at the top, which is the most frequent, down to whatever is the least frequent in 
that column. The contingency rated A1 (larceny), for instance, is a contingency in the 
traditional, common response category, with a high frequency of occurrence.  A 
contingency rated C15 (pandemic influenza) is in the homeland security spectrum, with a 
low frequency for occurrence.  This provides the law enforcement organization, the 
ability to assess the potential emergency response, for which the first responder 
organization requires capabilities.    
Contingencies in spectrum A are the majority of the law enforcement 
organizations response. This agency would adjust the assessed probability for threats 
illustrated in spectrum B based on intelligence or changes in vulnerabilities, or elevation 
of the homeland security threat advisory level.  Threats B-1 through B-5, are immediate 
traditional threats received.  Threats B6 through B10 are threats ranked according to the 
Homeland Security Threat Advisory System for which the organization must have 
planned protective measures.  
Spectrum C contains the homeland security and national preparedness responses 
to be considered for potential occurrence during a terrorist attack. The law enforcement 
organization requires capabilities to respond. 
This law enforcement illustration is an example of the assessment process for the 
threats that may be encountered by a member of the first responder community.   The 
spectrum of potential contingencies is necessary to identify and develop necessary plans 
and capabilities needed to counter the potential threats. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Emergency Response Planning Template - Organization Specific 
 
Figure 8 illustrates an emergency response planning template that can be adapted 
to specific organization needs for all spectrums of contingencies.  Such a template 
enables first responder planners to develop and adapt plans, identify the common 
resources and capabilities available to counter each assessed contingency, and then 
implement those plans.  This kind of contingency and threat assessment must be 
performed by every first responder organization.  To develop a contingency response 
package, planners from within the organization would simply answer the question “What 
can we do about the contingency?” and then develop appropriate response plans by 
utilizing the strengths of  the CBP, TBP, and SBP methodologies.  
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Figure 9.   Spectrum of Necessary Organization Capabilities 
 
Figure 9 shows the spectrum of necessary organization capabilities that first 
response planners would develop as the planning process goes forward.  Each 
organization would identify those capabilities that it could use to manage and mitigate the 
consequences that might arise from the different type of contingencies within the three 
spectrum areas.  Planners would then perform analysis and efficiency studies to assess the 
usefulness of capabilities that already exist to meet a given spectrum of contingencies, 
and to determine their usefulness for the different spectrums of contingencies within 
homeland security. This process would result in a menu of capabilities necessary for an 
organization to respond to a full spectrum of contingencies. 
Finally, planners would create and evaluate the necessary operational concepts to 
enable the organization's plans and capabilities to be used in the most effective way for 
successful management and mitigation of consequences arising from the many different 
types of contingencies. This step would allow planners to identify and coordinate 
resources and required personnel, by simply determining what tactics and procedures and 
steps should be taken, and by whom, in the event of a warning that a particular 
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contingency might unfold.  Development of a spectrum of necessary organization 
capabilities would give the organization a broad, adaptable menu of capabilities for an 
effective response to a full spectrum of contingencies. 
Figure 10 below explains how this first responder planning methodology for 
homeland security progresses.  Each first responder organization must have a dedicated 
planning group that will continuously assess the contingencies an organization may face.  
This group has to be aware of the organization’s budget, and the limitations it imposes on 
the planning process. The organization’s missions and objectives must be clearly defined, 
so that the planning group is able to consider the full spectrum of emergency response, 
from the traditional missions of the past, to the immediate threats of the present, and 
possible homeland security threats of the future, when performing an optimal 
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The planning group will assess existing capabilities against potential 
contingencies (which were determined during a previously completed contingency 
assessment), beginning with the contingencies in spectrum A.  They proceed through the 
other spectrums, identifying which capabilities could be adapted to meet the new set of 
contingencies.  When necessary, the organization will seek new capabilities to enhance 
its response to a broad spectrum of contingencies.   
Planners must then decide on the necessary organization capabilities required for 
an effective response to all the contingency spectrums.  Beginning with spectrum A, the 
most frequent organization response, the planning group evaluates “as–is” capabilities.  
These are capabilities an organization already possesses for traditional missions.  They 
then move to spectrum B, again assessing the organization's “as-is” capabilities against 
the set of capabilities that will be needed to meet immediate threats, and respond to the 
homeland security threat advisory system.  The organization will then look at the third 
contingency spectrum, column C, and again compare capabilities to ensure its readiness 
to respond to acts of terrorism and support homeland security.    
After completing this assessment the planning group places the required 
capabilities into a contingency spectrum for plans and capabilities as seen in Figure 11 
below, and devises a menu of capabilities and detailed response plans which becomes the 
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Figure 11.   Contingency Spectrum of Plans and Capabilities 
     
Once the contingency assessment is complete an organization could prepare its 
response to a contingency X in spectrum C, the homeland security spectrum. (See Figure 
12 below.)  It may have plans and capabilities already in place in spectrum A, from 
traditional mission Y, for example, that will be useful for meeting X.  Planners find there 
are also plans and capabilities that can be utilized in spectrum B from immediate threat Z.  
Thus an organization can improve its efficiency by using these analytical tools to 
evaluate a potential homeland security contingency in spectrum C, against the capability 
possessed by an organization for traditional missions in spectrum A, and in the context of 





Figure 12.   Cross-Cutting Capabilities for Successful Response 
 
When it uses a CBP planning strategy, an organization is not just planning for all 
the threats or possible homeland security contingencies individually, but is looking for 
cross-cutting plans, capabilities, and efficiencies so that the organization truly has 
“capability” plans that can be used to address all the contingencies an organization might 
encounter in spectrums A, B, and C simultaneously.    
The planning process concludes by using the strengths of CBP, TBP, and SBP to 
form emergency preparedness and response plans.  Once in place, each contingency plan 
is evaluated and adapted as necessary in order to ensure that the organization maintains 
its strengths and obtains necessary new capabilities for effective response.  The strengths 
of this new planning methodology are its adaptability to current and future contingencies, 
and its promotion of effective tactics and procedures for optimal response within a strict 






D. SUMMARY OF THE STRENGTHS AND BENEFITS OF THIS NEW 
PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of planning in the first responder community is to define a clear 
direction that can be followed consistently, and thus set the stage for responders to use 
their most relevant capabilities within existing limitations.  The challenges are to plan for 
and acquire the needed capacity; to organize, train, and properly equip first responders to 
meet the many different first responder missions and objectives.  
To achieve these objectives, first responder planning and design should 
incorporate CBP into existing planning methodologies, to move the focus away from 
specific acts of terrorism toward how a terrorist might perpetrate a terrorist event.  This 
CBP approach uses emergency response and preparedness concepts to drive planning and 
to guide the development of response capabilities.  It ensures that first responders can 
adapt and succeed across a broad range of scenarios. 
The recommended new planning methodology allows the organization to create a 
broad portfolio of responder capabilities that will perform robustly for uncertain future 
environments, including the unique challenges of homeland security, while ensuring 
continued success in traditional missions.  Extrapolating from the military models of 
planning, the first responder community is coming to recognize that SBP is limited to 
information based on past events. TBP focuses on response for timely threats of the 
present. CBP assesses the range of capabilities needed for overall preparation for 
consequence management of future events, regardless of how they might be perpetrated.   
If utilized by first responders for homeland security, this combined planning 
strategy will foster the development and maintenance of necessary capabilities and 
priorities that are identified through planning exercises. First responders will ensure that 
their organization will possess a number of standard capabilities to continue emergency 
response and to respond to acts of terrorism.  These future capabilities, once obtained, 
will help define what the first responder must be able to do in order to detect, deter, and 
prevent attack, and, when necessary, mitigate the effects of attacks that do occur.  The 
first responder community’s missions and objectives are wide in scope. Figure 11 shows 
that the requirements of the three spectrums of contingencies, though different in their 
specifics, could be met with similar capabilities.                   
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First responders continuously attempt to plan better, as evident in the FDNY 
Strategic Plan 2004/2005, which states: "The New York City Fire Department’s highest 
priority is to enhance its ability to respond to fires, emergencies, pre-hospital care 
emergencies and terrorist acts.  The Department’s strategy to increase operational 
preparedness focuses on investing in the continued enhancement of core capabilities."53   
The first responder planning methodology for homeland security provides much 
strength to an organization filling in the seams and gaps of emergency response and 
preparedness for homeland security missions.  Capability is evaluated using reasonable 
situations summarized in the development of contingency plans.  The scenarios planners 
develop plans that lie on a spectrum ranging from real world planning for traditional 
missions, through immediate planning for known threats, and include future response 
using generic plans and capabilities.  These scenarios and contingency plans reflect the 
type of tasks that first responders will undertake.    
This planning methodology emphasizes the recommendations of the DHS, which 
are informed by national security information relating to terrorism.  DHS recently 
established a set of fifteen standard threat scenarios to provide a baseline for planning, 
and funds training for response incidents and crises for which the first responder 
community must be prepared.  It strengthens first responder confidence by developing 
concepts that reduce gaps and seams among interdependent first responder organizations.   
Through a balance of near-term capabilities with longer-term requirements, this method 
better fulfills DHS requirements, and incorporates a national perspective for emergency 
response preparedness into the plans of local responder organizations. 
The new planning methodology is superior for planning with uncertainty, to 
provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of challenges and circumstances, while 
working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice.  It 
allows first responders to adjust rapidly to changes in the environment so they may 
improve their qualitative advantage over a more diverse set of required emergency 
responses,   now   and   in   the   future.   “Preparedness   is   the   key   to   mitigating   an  
 
53 Fire Department City of New York, "Strategic Plan 2004-2005", January 1, 2004, page ii. 
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emergency.”54  This new planning paradigm will help better prepare the fire service and 
others in the first responder community, those heroes first on scene, rushing in as 







54 Nicholson, John, Terrorism: Impetus for Change, NFPA Journal, November/December 2001 p. 45. 
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VIII. APPLICATION TO THE FIRST RESPONDER COMMUNITY: 
THE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF NEW YORK CITY 
A. FIRST RESPONDER CASE STUDY: THE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF NEW 
YORK CITY 
In this chapter, the experiences of the FDNY will serve as a case study to examine 
how the proposed First Responder Planning Methodology for Homeland Security can 
serve to improve preparedness planning. 
 
1. Organization Overview     
The FDNY is one of the largest first responder organizations in the United States, 
with over 11,000 firefighters, 3,000 EMT and paramedics, and about 1,000 support 
personnel. This department faces a wide range of potential contingencies related to 
terrorism, and continues to respond to over two million emergency situations and fires 
annually.  
New York City is a densely populated, culturally and racially diverse area.  It is 
one of the nation’s business centers, and a well-known symbol of freedom, wealth, 
democracy, and the American way of life; thus it makes a prime target for terrorist attack.  
Emergency response and preparedness, is a challenging task for the FDNY in this very 
uncertain security environment.   
The mission statement of the FDNY emphasizes the critical need for the 
organization to be ready to respond to the challenges of terrorist incidents, incidents 
involving hazardous materials, and the more routine fires and emergencies.  The 
statement reads, “As first responders to fires, public safety and medical emergencies, 
disasters and terrorist acts, the FDNY protects the lives and property of New York City 
residents and visitors.”55  Preparedness is one of the organization’s core values. The 
FDNY leadership has expressed this need to adapt and improve response operations to 
current and future needs by “enhancing preparedness planning to address new threats and 
complex, long term challenges” which includes the threat of terrorism. 56   
 
55 Fire Department of New York City, FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005 (New York City Fire 
Department, January 1, 2004), p. i. 
56 FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005, p. ii. 
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Ironically, although the department faces annual reductions in operations funding 
due to continuous budget cuts, the department’s missions, goals, and objectives continue 
to expand because of terrorism threats and homeland security requirements.  The 
department’s Bureau of Operations, where emergency response preparedness and 
planning are conducted, therefore must work to develop a more efficient and effective 
planning process that serves to ensure efficient and effective response to all missions, 
while doing "more with less."   
 
2. Planning Process 
The actual planning process until recently has been informal, relying on several 
teams of experienced fire officers and firefighters to work together to solve specific 
problems not addressed in existing plans.  The members chosen for these teams have 
come from within the various commands of the department (safety, operations, hazardous 
material, special operations, training, tactical, and emergency medical services); when 
necessary, they also have sought cooperation with other agencies. 
The planning process begins with a specific task and flows through various steps 
until it results in a plan.  As the plan develops it receives input from specialists and other 
resources.  Once complete, the plan is tested and then sent to the Chief of the Bureau of 
Operations and the Chief of Department, as well as to various other senior staff chiefs, 
for comment before being sent out to the Bureau of Training and field units, where it is 
implemented and adapted as necessary.  This informal process has encountered many 
problems as a means both to develop effective plans and to efficiently test and implement 
them.  FDNY needs an improved, more formal planning process if it is to acquire the 
varied capabilities it needs to prepare for new missions involving terrorism and homeland 
security, and coordinate normal planning for emergency response and preparedness. 
The new Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness was established within 
the Bureau of Operations to begin this shift to a formal planning process.  As its name 
indicates, the center is closely involved in matters regarding terrorist acts in New York 
City.   This   center   is   the   key  unit   for   organizing   planning   teams   composed  of  
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knowledgeable and experienced personnel within the department.  These teams will both 
develop necessary staffing and equipment, and recommend implementation of new plans, 
tactics, and procedures.  
 
3. Applying the New Planning Methodology    
To see how the new combined planning strategy can make a real-world difference 
take the example of a terrorist attack involving toxic chemicals: How should the FDNY 
respond to a series of chemical releases across the city while continuing simultaneously 
to provide effective traditional response on demand?  The proposed new First Responder 
Planning Methodology for Homeland Security (CBP, SBP, and TBP) will help solve this 
and related problems by providing a clear framework in which to first assess potential 
threat capabilities and then develop a full spectrum of measures for response and 
preparedness.  The resulting menu of emergency response capability packages will serve 
to prepare first responders for both terrorist events and homeland security incidents, 
while continuing to provide for effective traditional emergency response. 
 
4. Contingency Assessment    
The example of a planning group at the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness can illustrate the use of this planning methodology for emergency response 
threat assessment.  The potential contingencies that the FDNY might encounter can be 
seen in the FDNY table of potential emergency response contingencies (Table 3).  From 
this table planners can begin to develop a menu of operations capabilities for the FDNY 
to meet them.  The potential contingencies for the FDNY fall into three distinct 
spectrums of threat: A) Traditional FDNY Fire Missions and Response; B) Immediate 
Threats to New York City; and C) and Homeland Security Response. 















RESPONSE           
A1 Nonstructural Fires  Immediate Traditional 
Threats – Intel57
C1 Explosive Attack 
A2 Medical Emergencies B1 Medical Emergency C2 Industrial Chemical Attack 
A3 Vehicle Fire/Emergency B2 Water Resource Emergency C3 Chlorine Tank Explosion 
A4 Transformer Fires B3 Arson C4 Aerosol Anthrax 
A5 CO Emergency B4 Natural Disasters C5 Nerve Agent 
A6 Utility Emergency58 B5 Rioting C6 Blister Agent 
A7 Structural Fires B6 Bomb Threat  C7 Radiological Dispersion Device 
A8 Railroad (Fire, Emergency) B7 Impending Air Crash C8 Plague 
A9 Major Emergency59  Homeland Security Advisory 
System60
C9 Food Contamination 
A10 Haz Mat Incident B8 Low Condition – Green C10 Nuclear Device – Improvised 
  B9 Guarded Condition – Blue C11 Cyber Attack 
  B10 Elevated Condition – Yellow C12 Foreign Animal Disease 
  B11 High Condition – Orange C13 Major Earthquake 
  B12 Severe Condition – Red C14 Major Hurricane 
    C15 Pandemic Influenza 
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As this assessment illustrates, there is a wide range of contingencies that the 
department needs to prepare for.  Table 3 lists approximately thirty-seven threat 
contingencies that demand an effective department reaction. Ten of these (spectrum A) 
 
57 Threats not related to terrorism such as arson, personal injury, and weather. 
58 Gas, electrical, water, and steam emergencies.  
59 Collapse, airplane crash, train derailment, multiple casualty incidents. 
60 Department of Homeland Security’s Threat Advisory System represents an increasing risk of 
terrorist attacks.  First responders are to develop and implement preparedness measures as appropriate, 
according to the Fire and Emergency Services Preparedness Guidelines. 
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are traditional missions needing a standard fire department response, for which SBP has 
been used with success.  There are twelve potential immediate-type threats contingencies 
(spectrum B) that require a TBP methodology to prepare the department for immediate 
response.  And then there are fifteen homeland security preparedness scenarios (spectrum 
C) for which the department must use a CBP approach to devise an effective response 
strategy.  The FDNY Table of Potential Contingencies shows the plausible occurrences 
for which this department requires certain capabilities to respond effectively, and 
highlights the need for FDNY to be ready to adapt to an ever-changing situation. 
  
5. Contingency Spectrums  
The three contingency spectrums in Table 3 are rated based on first responder 
missions and frequency of occurrence.  Frequency, however, is not related to the severity 
of the consequences.  Spectrum A includes contingencies that will be encountered 
frequently.  Spectrum B contingencies will be encountered less frequently, and spectrum 
C contingencies are rare. While it directs preparedness planners to the most likely threat, 
this full spectrum emergency response/contingency assessment also depicts other, less-
likely threats that may occur just the same.  They are ranked in order from the most 
serious (1) to the least serious in descending order in each of the three columns.   
The assessed probability for traditional fire or emergency incidents (spectrum A) 
ranks them by frequency: A1 through A10.  These are the most likely and critical events 
for FDNY first responders, accounting for over two million responses annually.  The 
department must ensure a continued effective response for these missions.  
The assessed probability for threats to New York City (spectrum B) will be 
adjusted by the FDNY based on intelligence “chatter” or perceived changes in 
vulnerabilities (for example, during a special event in New York City), or the elevation of 
the homeland security threat advisory system. B1 through B7 relates to threats the 
department receives regarding traditional missions, such as impending natural disasters 
and arson.  These threats are based on timely intelligence.  B8 through B12 represent the 
threats related to the intelligence behind the homeland security advisory system, which is 
designed to trigger protective measures when specific information about a threat to a 
specific sector or geographic region is received.  It combines threat information with 
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vulnerability assessments and provides communications to public safety officials and the 
public.  The development of preparedness measures for the different color codes requires 
a process similar to the methodology used in the new planning model.  Planners analyze 
capability requirements and menus for the different contingencies using “as-is” 
capabilities.  Once seams and gaps are identified, they can be eliminated with the 
acquisition of necessary new capabilities.  The threat-based color-coded system helps the 
FDNY create a concise generic menu of necessary capabilities to meet its mission goals. 
The homeland security-national preparedness spectrum (C) must be addressed in 
the department's contingency planning because of the potential for terrorist attack.  These 
are the asymmetrical threats and hazards, including acts of terrorism that DHS believes 
present the greatest potential risk and potential to the nation as a whole.  National 
Planning scenarios have been designed by DHS to help first responder organizations 
design capabilities that will enable them to respond effectively to these types of events.  
All jurisdictions and first responders are supposed to consider these National Planning 
Scenarios in their emergency response and preparedness plans, and put the necessary 
capabilities in place.  
While greatly oversimplified, the example of contingency potentials illustrated in 
Table 3 is a sufficient assessment of threat for planners to use to formulate an effective 
operational plan that includes the appropriate capabilities needed for successful 
responses.     
 
CBP  
     Homeland Security 




Figure 13.   FDNY Contingencies and Necessary Capabilities   
 
6. Benefit of Contingency and Threat Assessment 
The type of contingency and threat assessment depicted in Figure 13 can help the 
FDNY determine contingencies and the necessary capabilities to meet them.  By starting 
with a clear scheme, FDNY planners can develop plans and obtain resources to respond 
to each predicted contingency capability, incorporating these plans into the department’s 
tactics and procedures, as soon as possible.  One example of a plan that needs to be 
formulated is the potential contingency simplified as C-2 in the table of FDNY potential 
contingencies in NYC:  “industrial chemical attacks.” In order for FDNY planners to 
develop a consequence management response, planners from various commands inside 
the FDNY would answer the question “What can be done about C-2?”  
In a planning meeting of representatives from the Bureau of Fire Operations 
(Firefighting, and Emergency Medical Services – EMS), senior staff, and specialized 
internal agencies like Special Operations would first identify the capabilities and 
operational concepts that could be used to manage and mitigate the consequences of this 
type of terrorist attack.  This step would also allow planners to determine and coordinate 
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the personnel, equipment and other resources necessary to operate during this type of 
attack simply  by describing what steps should be taken and by whom in the event of a 
warning of  “industrial chemical attacks”. 
 
7. Formulating the Plan  
The FDNY would formulate plans and determine the necessary capabilities for 
potential emergency response contingency C-2.  One role of these plans is to integrate 
and coordinate units, operations, and resources from all the tactical commands and 
support agencies that could participate in contingency operations for the department.  For 
example, the Chief of Operations down through borough and division commanders in the 
threatened areas could implement unit response plans and coordinate the specific 
procedures for industrial chemical attack with the Police Department, the Office of 
Emergency Management, and other necessary agencies, while simultaneously continuing 
to respond to more frequent traditional missions.   
Senior staff and representatives from EMS at headquarters could also develop a 
response plan and tactics and procedures for industrial chemical attack that identifies 
required combinations of specific EMS units, personnel, equipment, and other resources. 
This is the point at which they will analyze the “as-is” capabilities of the FDNY, compare 
them to the actual needs of the C-2 scenario, and then be able to identify the capabilities 
that will need to be acquired.  Each possible contributor to the contingency mission 
(FDNY Hazardous Materials Unit, Special Operations Command, Operational Units, 
Safety Command, Logistics and Support, the Bureau of Operations, the Bureau of Fire 
Communications, and others) identifies options for necessary capabilities, specifying 
units and resource requirements, including the means necessary to utilize those 
capabilities.  Also at this time, planners will determine any specialized capabilities they 
might require and incorporate those into the formulated plan and required capabilities.  
Once a given contingency is plotted in this manner, what emerges is a menu of 
options for emergency response and preparedness that specifies the various capabilities 
necessary to detect, deter, and, mitigate the consequences of, in this instance, an 
industrial chemical attack in New York City.  This final package will then be formally 
presented to the uniformed senior decision-makers (Chief of Operations and the Chief of 
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Department) and then to the Fire Commissioner, so that they can make informed 
decisions using cost-benefit analysis as they decide which resources are necessary for the 
department to fulfill its missions.  
 
8. Cross-Cutting Capabilities 
When during planning the projected capabilities for meeting contingency C-2 are 
evaluated against what capabilities already exist for traditional contingencies and 
immediate threats, the department is not just planning for each separate contingency in 
each spectrum, but is looking for cross-cutting capabilities and efficiencies.  These are 
integral to devising a menu of capability plans that can be used to address all of the 
contingencies in all of the spectrums simultaneously. 
Continuing the example of an industrial chemical attack, there is a limited number 
of specialized hazardous materials teams and a high possibility of false alarms once the 
event is in full swing.  The particular demands of this contingency should lead planners 
using a CBP strategy to make decisions about the appropriate number of Hazardous 
Materials support units and firefighters to train as hazardous materials specialists, to 
ensure their department can mount an effective C-2 response.  Senior staff will be able to 
make the best decisions only if they have a clear understanding of the contingency itself, 
the capabilities a response will require, alternative measures, and the likely impact a 
deficit in any required capability will have on the success of the response.  When they do 
find a weakness in the department's existing capabilities, the planning group can pass the 
information on to senior staff, who will then forward it for procurement to support units, 
such as the FDNY Bureau of Technology’s Technical Oversight Committee.  Ultimately, 
the Research and Development unit will be tasked to acquire these new capabilities for 
the department.  
Formal FDNY plans that include clear capability requirements could also provide 
a means to confirm these requirements through suitable field testing and piloting.  These 
preplanned packages of plans can then be used to devise operation circulars, training 
procedures, and table-top exercises for the senior uniform staff of the department, to 
validate options and projected requirements.  Chiefs who will respond to a C-2-type 
incident could also call on their own experience with similar situations to overcome 
problems, improve and organize plans, and identify other necessary capabilities for 
response.  For recognized deficits, the senior staff can seek additional resources from the 
Bureau of Fiscal Services, based on a cost-benefit analysis.    
 
Spectrum A Capabilities 
Contingencies  
A B C D E F 
G H I J K L 
M N O P Q 
R S T U V W 











Figure 14.   Menu of Contingencies and Capabilities 
 
 As Figure 14 shows, the contingency spectrums on the left give the department 
the whole picture of what it needs to prepare for.  On the right is a list of all the 
capabilities that the department would need to respond to each contingency individually.  
These can help the department decide how it will prepare for every contingency.  In the 
center are those generic capabilities the FDNY must have to be effective regardless of the 
contingency.  This exercise demonstrates how a full spectrum analysis can help planners 
pinpoint the needed capabilities, and plan for them to be funded and developed into an 
optimal menu of capabilities.   
 
8. Planning Challenges and Demands 
This FDNY case study illustrates how a first responder organization might use 
this new planning methodology to prevail over current planning challenges and demands 
for the traditional and homeland security missions.  In the FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-
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2005 the department has acknowledged the need for a better planning process:  “The 
attacks have given us a new sense of urgency to broaden our response capabilities to 
include terrorism preparedness.”61 Adopting this new first responder planning 
methodology for homeland security, which incorporates the strengths of CBP, SBP, and 
TBP, could provide a formal and common approach to successful emergency response 
planning and preparedness.   
 
B. CASE STUDY IMPLICATIONS 
As the FDNY case study demonstrates, this proposed new first responder 
planning methodology for homeland security can provide for a full spectrum of 
emergency response.  The new planning process would allow the FDNY to identify 
capabilities necessary for consequence management and mitigation of various 
contingencies within the three contingency spectrum areas.  Analysis and efficiency 
studies are performed by comparing the different spectrums of contingencies against 
existing capabilities.  This would create a menu of capabilities necessary for the FDNY to 
respond to all its missions, including immediate threats and terrorism.  It will serve first 
responder organizations well by identifying those necessary capabilities and resources to 
overcome the present shortfalls in preparedness and response.  
This innovative planning concept for the fire service and others in the first 
responder community may be the most effective approach to reforming planning culture 
during this difficult and enduring period of change.  The threat of terrorism is real, and 
homeland security missions will only continue to increase.  First responders will be first 
on the scene for all contingencies and must plan to be successful for both traditional and 
non-traditional missions.   
The homeland security case study presented here shows that this new planning 
methodology is comprehensive enough to bridge the gaps between traditional and 
homeland security missions.  It offers a formal planning process for first responder 
organizations to use in deciding on resource allocation and necessary capabilities, and for 
formulating highly adaptable response plans.  
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
Strong support exists throughout the first responder community and the federal 
government for a better, more formal emergency preparedness planning methodology 
that will take into account wide spectrums of contingencies and promote more efficient 
and cost effective emergency response preparedness.  This support is evident in the 
“National Preparedness” strategy (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8), which 
targets local jurisdictions and the first responder community.  Although we cannot easily 
accept or understand terrorism, predict specific threats or targets, or protect everything at 
risk, once on scene first responders can manage a terrorist event in an organized, safe, 
and professional way, controlling injuries and mitigating damage, and thus diminishing 
the consequences of terrorism.62    
It is all the more important for the first responder community to implement a 
better planning methodology to incorporate homeland security as part of its mission.   
The fire service and other components of the first responder community are looking for 
more guidance and better ways to plan during these uncertain times, within an 
increasingly restrictive budgetary framework.  Scenario and threat-based planning are 
already being used by the first responder community.  However, these are inadequate to 
deal with the asymmetric threats and consequences of terrorism.   
I have proposed the incorporation of capabilities-based planning to complement 
the present first responder planning methodologies.  CBP will enable the fire service and 
the rest of the first responder community to perform much more effectively in the future 
than they have in the past by providing a basis for resource allocation and planning for 
response that offers important advantages over current, informal practices.  In particular, 
they will be better prepared than they are today to respond not only to their traditional 
missions, but acts of terrorism, and homeland security threats as well.  To do so well will 
require the first responder organizations to set priorities and make choices based on their 
own geographic locations and budgets.  Achieving planning and decision superiority and 
generating tailored effects across the emergency response space allow the fire service and 
 
62 Gray, Colin S., “Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,” Parameters, US Army War College 
Quarterly, Spring 2002 retrieved June 28, 2004: http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02spring/gray.htm. 
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the other first responders to control any situation over a range of contingencies.  This 
thesis proposes a new integrated planning methodology that combines the planning 
strengths of SBP, TBP, and CBP.  The new method identifies capabilities that could be 
used to manage and mitigate the consequences of the different types of contingencies 
within the various response spectrums.   It allows an organization to perform analysis and 
efficiency studies to evaluate the different spectrums of contingencies against existing 
capabilities and create a menu of capabilities necessary for the FDNY to respond to all its 
missions, including immediate threats and terrorism, in the most efficient and cost-
effective manner.  This methodology could be used by first responders to develop the 
better planning necessary to incorporate the homeland security mission.  This thesis also 
examines emerging best practices used by the U.S. military that can be incorporated into 
the First Responders Planning Methodology for Homeland Security. 
Terrorism has always existed in our world.  In the past decade, our country, a true 
bastion of freedom and democracy, has been targeted by misanthropic extremists hiding 
behind a cloak of religious fervor.  New York City in particular has been the focus of 
notorious and violent attempts by these misguided zealots.  To temper this threat, the first 
responder community is engaged in a tremendous undertaking, to provide the same 
effective service as in the past.    
First responders must develop plans and strategies, procure state of the art 
equipment, and train personnel.  This is a formidable task in an era in which we must do 
more with less, as dollars become tighter in times of diminished budgets.  It is my belief 
that the men and women of the first responder community will accept this challenge, 
overcome the planning obstacles, and continue to provide the professional service 
American citizens have become accustomed to, and rely on.  To succeed, the fire service 
and other first responders must adopt a new planning methodology to integrate necessary 
capabilities providing for innovation to develop a menu of well-organized and planned 
responses that are effective and adaptable to all situations. 
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